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Of “Frustrate Desire”: Feminist Self-Postponement in 
George MacDonald’s Lilith
John Pennington
“She [Christina Rossetti] was replete with the spirit of self-postponement” 
 - W. M. Rossetti
 n the influential The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer 
and the Nineteenth Century Literary Imagination, Sandra Gilbert and Susan 
Gubar begin their study with two epigraphs: one from Laura Riding’s “Eve’s 
Side of It,” the other from George MacDonald’s adult fantasy Lilith:
          The strife of thought, accusing and excusing, began afresh, 
          and gathered fierceness. The soul of Lilith lay naked to the 
           torture of pure interpenetrating inward light. She began to moan, 
           and sigh deep sighs, then murmur as holding colloquy with a 
           dividual self: her queendom was no longer whole; it was divided 
           against itself . . . . At length she began what seemed a tale about 
           herself, in a language so strange, and in forms so shadowy, that I 
           could but here and there understand a little. (viii)
Gilbert and Gubar claim that the Lilith myth:
           represents the price women have been told they must pay for 
           attempting to define themselves. And it is a terrible price: cursed 
           both because she is a character who “got away” and because she 
          dared to usurp the essentially literary authority implied by the act 
           of naming, Lilith is locked into a vengeance (child-killing) which 
           can only bring her more suffering (the killing of her own children). 
           (35)
They view Lilith as a metaphor for “the problems of female authorship and
female authority” that represents the following:
           a life of feminine submission, of “contemplative purity,” is a life 
           of silence, a life that has no pen and no story, while a life of female 
           rebellion, of “significant action,” is a life that must be silenced, a 
           life whose monstrous pen tells a terrible story. (36)
 Lilith’s terrible story is given that monstrous pen by MacDonald 
in Lilith (1895), a novel that has created interpretative debates amongst 
MacDonald critics, for the myth seems too expansive for his fantastic 
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imagination. Robert Lee Wolff in The Golden Key, for example, calls the 
novel “feeble, ambiguous, and inconsistent in its imagery, full of senile 
hatreds and resentments, and the most violent in its aggressions of all 
MacDonald’s works” (332), concluding that “MacDonald has muddled his 
own symbols and clouded the entire cosmology that he has been trying to 
construct” (363). However, William Raeper, much more positive about the 
book in general, argues that MacDonald “was always dogged by this sinister 
figure” (366) but “was able to integrate his unconscious [end of page 26] 
anger and fear into a powerful myth, for at last even Lilith, MacDonald’s own 
image of the betraying woman, does lie down in the House of Death and seek 
salvation” (383). And Roderick McGillis admits: “In short, Lilith is a troubling 
book” (47); Lilith becomes “the woman who refuses to be written” (51). But 
Lilith, he suggests, is “a great book . . . because of the subversive power of its 
mysterious images” (53).
 Lilith is a troubling book; it is also a problematic book, one haunted by 
the mysterious image of that metamorphosing character, Lilith. Mr Vane, the 
narrator of the fantasy novel, recognises the difficulty of “reading” Lilith. When 
seeing Lilith as Princess of the evil city of Bulika, Vane states: “My frame 
quivered with conflicting consciousnesses, to analyse which I had no power. I 
was simultaneously attracted and repelled: each sensation seemed either” (132). 
Such contradictory impulses of attraction and repulsion of Lilith propel the 
fantasy novel and become the central metaphor for our reading response to 
Lilith. As Vane journeys through the magical realm, he admits that he “was lost 
in a space larger than imagination” (33), a space that represents the tensions of 
frustrate desire. In a sense, the Lilith myth is too expansive, too complex, too 
contradictory for MacDonald’s imagination: Lilith’s “dividual self”—at once 
repulsive yet fascinating, dangerous yet enticing, horrific yet erotic—overpowers 
the narrative space in such an aggressive way that MacDonald must eventually 
silence the temptress by imprisoning her in his Christian myth of redemption. He 
places her in a room of his own, but the narrative finally is unable to silence 
her completely, for her self is dissolved only to haunt the fringes of the novel, 
an absence that is always present, that is vocalised clearly in the narrative. That 
attempted silencing, in turn, suggests that MacDonald struggled, like Christina 
Rossetti in Goblin Market, with the fear and fascination of temptation and fall, 
finally “resolving” this tension via Christian redemption. Helena Michie argues 
that:
           absence seems to be the primary motif in fiction of the period; the 
           Victorian novel is haunted by a series of dim shadowy figures that 
           hover on the margins of canonical texts. They are warnings in 
           whispers, an implied contrast to heroines; like the governess, they 
           hint at alternate tragic endings—they partake of none of the 
           physicality which, in turn, haunts the Victorian canon. (72)
 MacDonald, we shall see, engages the shadowy Lilith myth to 
comment upon the conflicting temptations of desire that challenge societal 
unity at the expense of self. Thus Lilith is condemned, like Laura and Lizzy in 
Goblin Market, to “self-postponement”—she must sacrifice her feminine desire 
for self to the Christian myth of selflessness, ultimately denying her power as 
woman to that transcendental patriarchal signifier, God. Lilith is a fascinating 
novel that mirrors MacDonald’s own “frustrate desire” over the fleshly desires 
and [27] Christian goodness, a mirror that reflects a tension indicative of the 
Victorian period.
 The binary polarities that frame the narrative are Blakeian—
innocence versus experience—and these polarities represent those dichotomous 
feminine images that Gilbert and Gubar define as the angel and the monster—
Lilith, interestingly enough, “both the first woman and the first monster” (35). 
Thus Lilith, one can argue, is trapped by her divided self—the pull towards 
angelic figures (represented by Eve, Mara and Lona) and Lilith’s demand to 
remain her own monstrous Self (represented by shadow, worm and vampire). In 
Woman and the Demon, Nina Auerbach argues that the woman as demon is: 
           that disruptive spiritual energy which also engorges the divine. 
           The demon is first of all the woman’s familiar, the source of her 
           ambiguous holiness, but it is also the popular—and demonic—
           imagination that endowed her with this holiness in defiance of 
           three cherished Victorian institutions: the family, the patriarchal 
           state, and God the father. (1)
The demon, suggests Auerbach, provides “new icons, new shapes for the self, 
new sources of belief’ (2). Bram Dijkstra contends that “the search for woman 
as the lily, the paragon of virtue, had carried within itself the discovery of Lilith, 
of woman as snake, the inevitable dualistic opposite of the image of virginal 
purity” (216). Thus Lilith becomes the negative transformation of female purity. 
Erich Neumann finds Lilith symbolic of “spiritual-psychic death” (74) that can 
become one of “the forerunners of inspiration and vision and so manifest . . . 
on a road leading to salvation, through extinction of death to rebirth” (76). Lilith 
certainly is one such demon, for she denies family (abandoning and eventually 
killing her daughter, Lona), denies the patriarchal state (refusing domestic life as 
Adam’s wife), and denies God (refusing to be controlled by her maker and His 
myth). Yet MacDonald suggests at the end of the fantasy that she will transform 
into something good.
 What may be the most fascinating demonic subversion in the novel, 
however, is Lilith’s defence of the individual Self, her refusal to succumb to the 
power of others. Until the end of the fantasy, Lilith maintains her own identity 
in spite of and in defiance of patriarchal control and the submissive women 
who are willing to become passive angels. As a demon, Lilith thwarts angelic 
imprisonment for monstrous freedom. Thus Lilith becomes a contradictory 
figure in Lilith, a true Blakean figure that marries heaven and hell, for as Blake 
tells us: “Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason 
and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human existence” (pl. 3).
 Early in the novel, Vane follows Mr. Raven, who is also Adam, upstairs 
to the room with the mirror, which becomes the portal to the alternative world. 
Of course, a mirror symbolises the self, but it also represents the Other, the 
double, [28] and, like Alice’s looking-glass, this mirror reflects an alternative 
world of possibility where “all was vague and uncertain” (8). Immediately after 
entering the mirror world, Vane writes: “I did not know myself . . . . As for the 
name I went by in my own world, I had forgotten it, and did not care to recall 
it, for it meant nothing” (11). Vane is willing to abandon his very essence in 
this new world: he represents the path MacDonald’s characters generally are to 
take—abandonment of self for the great good of redemption through death. But 
Lilith veers off this path. She is Self, but she is also confined by MacDonald’s 
world view that demands relinquishment of Self for the Spirit—which is 
reflected in Adam and God. Lilith is caught in the process of “feminist self-
postponement,” which Kathleen Blake defines as “the evasion of one pattern of 
self-limitation [which] involves the imposition of another” (ix). In the angel-
monster opposition, Lilith is confronted with the feminist self-postponement 
double-bind: she refuses to lose Self and become the passive angel represented by 
Eve, but by not embracing the angelic, she must remain a monster if she wants to 
continue to live and be her own Self, thus doomed to kill her daughter Lona.
 What compels Lilith to live in the world of Self is desire—or more 
precisely, frustrated desire—which ultimately fragments her Self in the fantasy. 
Vane’s first vision of Lilith depicts the angel-monster dichotomy as Lilith 
transforms from “angelic” beauty to monsters before his eyes:
           She was beautiful but with such a pride at once and misery on her 
           countenance that I could hardly believe what yet I saw . . . . 
          Suddenly pressing both hands on her heart, she fell to the ground, 
           and the mist rose from her and melted in the air. I ran to her. But 
           she began to writhe in such torture that I stood aghast A moment 
           more and her legs, hurrying from her body, sped away serpents. 
           From her shoulders fled her arms as in terror, serpents also. Then 
           something flew up from her like a bat, and when I looked again, 
           she was gone . . . . Behind me rose a waste and sickening cry, as of 
           frustrate desire. (50)
 Vane later finds Lilith in a trance wasting away; he warms the cold, 
naked body with his body; feeds her; and bathes her in the warm waters of a 
stream, but each night he has unsettling dreams:
           Every time I slept, I dreamed of finding a wounded angel, who, 
           unable to fly, remained with me until at last she loved me and 
           would not leave me; and every time I woke, it was to see, instead 
           of an angel-visage with lustrous eyes, the white, motionless, 
          wasted face upon the couch: (104)
Vane desires to possess and control Lilith, the same goal Adam has for her, yet 
Lilith is unyielding, transforrning from angel to monster in order to maintain her 
Self. She is ironically labelled a wounded angel, but more precisely she is 
a [29] vampire, whom Vane describes as follows: “Her mouth wore a look 
of satisfied passion; she wiped from it a streak of red,” her “thirst demoniac” 
(138). Thus she transforms into the white leech and sucks the blood from Vane, 
nourishing her Self back to strength, her vampire or succubus self-symbolic 
of sexual desire, but desire that is more auto-erotic—Lilith lives solely for 
herself, dependent upon no one. Before fleeing Vane, Lilith tells him: “We 
must understand each other! . . . . You have done me the two worst of wrongs 
—compelled me to live, and put me to shame: neither of them can I pardon!” 
(111). Vane remarks later: “Could such beauty as I saw, and such wickedness as 
I suspected, exist in the same person?” (133).
 Lilith, caught in the throes of self-postponement, cannot be forced to 
live or die; she cannot be beholden to anyone but herself. And this makes her 
in the eyes of Adam and his philosophy a monster. She later tells Vane: “I . . . 
live to live on. Old age is to you a horror; to me it is a dear desire: the older we 
grow, the nearer we are to our perfection” (134). Of course, Lilith professes 
the opposite doctrine to that which Adam or Mr Raven preaches in the House 
of Death, where death is the great sleep that leads to redemption and the true 
beginning of life. Thus as Adam encourages Vane to die into life, Lilith desires 
life at the expense of death, which is a relinquishing of Self to the creator, God, 
who gives Life under His own terms. As self-creator, Lilith tempts Vane to 
embrace her desire; she now wants to “create” Vane in her image and control 
him:
           But you must satisfy my desire or set me free—prove yourself 
           priceless or worthless! To satisfy the hunger of my love, you must 
           follow me, looking for nothing, not gratitude, not even pity in 
           return!—follow and find me, and be content with merest presence, 
           with scantest forbearance! (135)
“What you have made me is yours!” taunts Lilith to Vane. “I will repay you as 
never yet did woman! My power, my beauty, my love are your own: take them” 
(136). And Vane tells us that “for a moment I was tempted to love a lie” (136).
 Lilith’s desire to live contributes to her self-postponement, for to live 
she must remain a passionate monster or deny desire and become a passive 
angel. Leo Bersani, in A Future for Astyanax: Character and Desire in 
Literature, argues that the nineteenth century novel is torn between two selves: 
the socially defined self and the free, universal transcendent self; consequently, 
most realistic fiction of the century tried to posit the myth of the coherent self, 
where “a rigidly ordered self contributes to a pervasive cultural ideology of 
the self which serves the established social order” (56). “Desire makes being 
problematic,” argues Bersani. “[T]he notion of a coherent unified self is 
threatened by the discontinuous, logically incompatible images of a desiring 
imagination” (84). According to Bersani, this desire is primarily subversive in 
two ways: “Desire [30] can subvert social order; it can also disrupt novelistic 
order. The nineteenth-century novel is haunted by the possibility of these 
subversive movements, and it suppresses them with a brutality both shocking 
and eminently logical” (66). Of course, MacDonald abandoned the realistic 
novel for his final book, returning to the more expansive and subversive 
fantastical mode that he began his career with in Phantastes. (1858).
 The “genre” choice is calculated. Rosemary Jackson argues that fantasy 
“is a literature of desire, which seeks that which is experienced as absence and 
loss” (3). To Jackson, fantasy can “tell of” or “expel” (3) this desire, which 
makes the mode or genre inherently oxymoronic:
           The movement from the first to the second of these functions, from 
           expression as manifestation to expression as expulsion, is one of 
          the recurrent features of fantasy narratives, as it tells of the 
           impossible attempt to realise desire, to make visible the invisible 
          and to discover absence. (4)
By uncovering this absence of desire in the guise of Lilith, and by attempting to 
expel this very desire, MacDonald opens up a very subversive can of narrative 
and theological worms. (Remember, Lilith at one point in the narrative is a 
leech.) Even in the fantasy mode, where an author has the freedom to tell 
of taboo desire, Lilith seems too powerful for the narrative to control. As 
a character of desire, Lilith is, in a sense, coherent self-postponement, for 
a coherent or unified self would imprison her, as Bersani argues, “within a 
psychology which [the character’s] creator has developed from the society being 
contested, a psychology of the coherently structured and. significantly expressive 
self” (59-60). Lilith then has an “ontological slipperiness” where her being is 
“always somewhere else” (198). She cannot be controlled by the thematic centre 
(redemption by God) and the authorial creator (MacDonald); she slips around 
throughout the novel, transforming into various others, feeding off Vane. Or 
as Bersani argues: “Desire . . . is essentially vampiristic”; “the fate of all 
fascination with the self as the other—the fate of a radical open-endedness of 
being—is a kind of restless immortality” (212).
 This restless immortality is what Lilith craves but cannot have, for she 
must be silenced and made to sleep and rise again, ultimately imprisoned by 
her creator. She is trapped in MacDonald’s patriarchal Christian universe. The 
fascination with Lilith, then, is with the ending—or the supposed closure to 
Lilith’s character—which forces MacDonald to “tame” the monster thematically 
and structurally in the fantasy. Two key scenes reflect this tension that 
MacDonald is unable (and maybe unwilling) to resolve. The first scene concerns 
Adam and Lilith when they “meet” in Vane’s house after he climbs a tree back 
into the “real” narrative world. Adam reads from a fragmented manuscript which 
is Lilith’s story in her own words. McGillis points out that “Adam reads this 
[31] book in order to reassume control over his first wife Lilith, to put an end to 
her protean behaviour . . . The book which contains her words is used to control 
her” (46). Adam tells Vane of Lilith’s history: God “brought me an angelic 
splendour to be my wife: there she lies! For her first thought was power, she 
counted it slavery to be one with me, and bear children for Him who gave her 
being” (154). Lilith’s designated role is to be an angelic mother-figure. But Lilith 
rebels and is sent off into the night world. Adam gets a new wife, Eve, whom 
Adam describes as follows: “but my Eve repented, and is now beautiful as never 
was woman or angel, while her groaning, travailing world is the nursery of our 
Father’s children” (155). Eve is reduced to a beautiful object—an angel—whose 
primary function is as child bearer. Adam even tells Vane: “for even Lilith shall 
be saved by her childbearing” (154). Upon hearing Adam, Lilith, who has been 
hearing all this as a Persian cat, transforms into “a woman once more” and says, 
“I will not repent. I will drink the blood of thy child” (156). In this scene the 
self-postponement that Lilith finds herself facing is clear: to remain her own 
Self, or repent and become a wife/mother/angel in the service of Adam and God. 
The other central scene entails Mara, Adam and Eve’s daughter and “double” 
of Lona, Lilith’s daughter whom Lilith has killed. Mara attempts to get Lilith to 
repent. Mara, however, represents bitterness and lives in the House of Sorrow, 
which may represent the loss of female identity—it is bitter and sad, as Rossetti’s 
Laura can attest to. Mara tells Lilith that if she will repent and give herself over 
to Adam, she will be “remade” into her proper image as woman. Again, Lilith 
rebels. Lilith’s desire for Self is seen in her challenge to Mara as she catalogues 
her defiance in a series of epitaphs:
           “I will be myself and not another!”
           “I will be what I mean myself now.”
           “I would do after my nature.”
           “I will do as my Self pleases—as my Self desires.”
           “I will do what I will to do.”
           “I am what I am; no one can take from me myself!”
           “Another shall not make me!” 
          “No one ever made me. I defy that Power to unmake me from a 
          free woman!” (208-09). 
When Mara tells Lilith that if she does not repent she will suffer, Lilith answers: 
“But be free!” (209). Lilith’s defiance is centred around her desire for the power 
of Self. Even when Mara has her look into a mirror to see her Self, Lilith states: 
“I will not be remade! . . . I will not be aught of his making” (211-12); “I will 
yet be mistress of myself! I am still what I have always known myself—queen of 
Hell, and mistress of the worlds! (215). [32]
 Thus we face the crux of the narrative problem: what can be done with 
Lilith in the narrative? Should she remain free? Or should she be subdued? 
Should she become fulfilled? Or should she remain in a lack? MacDonald, 
it seems, writes himself into an impasse, for at the end of the fantasy he 
unconvincingly (in the narrative sense, not necessarily in terms of MacDonald’s 
Christian world view) “converts” Lilith, domesticates her so she can be like 
the other women in the  fantasy—Eve, Mara, and Lona, all angels, all Great 
Mothers. But Lilith has continually rejected these roles; thematically and 
aesthetically she should remain a monster. After all, she has just killed her own 
daughter. Nina Auerbach recognises MacDonald’s fictional problem:
           Lilith seems too large and suggestive a figure for MacDonald’s 
           religious allegory to encompass; his declamatory female 
           overreacher stalks about without being given much to do until she 
           is chastened by an abruptly introduced and not very convincing 
           male, Adam. MacDonald further dilutes his queen by 
           counterbalancing her ambition against the benevolent wisdom of 
           Eve, Mara, and Lona, three “good” ruling women who preside over 
           the House of Death, soothing its inhabitants into a mesmeric trance 
           to await a vague universal awakening. (38)
Thus after seeing her Self in the mirror, Vane tells us that: “She was what God 
could not have created. She had usurped beyond her share in self-creation, and 
her part had undone His! She saw now what she had made, and behold, it was 
not good!” (216). And Lilith conveniently repents. She states: “I yield. I cannot 
hold out. I am defeated.—Not the less, I cannot open my hand” (216). This 
scene seems unsatisfactory, for what she sees in the mirror is exactly what she 
wants to see: a Self-creation not at the mercy of any maker. Why she gives up, 
then, makes little narrative sense, except that MacDonald needs her to repent 
so that his story can move towards closure. Thus Lilith’s character seems 
inconsistent.
 Lilith’s sudden surrender can be explained simply if we acknowledge 
that MacDonald believed that evil is only a stage in the continual progress 
toward goodness. At the end of Phantastes, the narrator, Anodos, writes:
           yet I know that good is coming to me—that good is always coming; 
           though few have at all times the simplicity and the courage to believe 
           it. What we call evil, is the only and best shape, which, for the 
           person and his condition at the time, could be assumed by the best 
          good. And so Farewell.
But the Phantastes solution is more a problem in Lilith, for Lilith’s 
transformation is problematic. In Idols of Perversity, Dijkstra catalogues the 
images of woman in nineteenth-century visual art (which correspond closely to 
Gilbert and Gubar’s angel-monster dichotomy). He writes: [33]
          This is a book filled with the dangerous fantasies of the 
          Beautiful People of a century ago. It contains a few scenes 
          of exemplary virtue and many more of lurid sin. Much of it 
          deals with magnificent dreams of intellectual achievement 
          doomed to wither before the tempting presence of woman, who 
          . . . is to be found dragging man into a grim trough of 
          perversion. (vii)
He continues:
          Around the middle of the nineteenth century, . . . the promise 
          of material progress and the cultural success of the functional 
          marginalization of women, had made males heady with 
          confidence that they might actually succeed in changing 
          “earthly woman, with a woman’s weakness, a woman’s faults” 
          back into “the unforgotten Eve of Paradise.” (4-5)
Thus MacDonald’s basic tenet that all evil is in the process of becoming good 
gets tangled into gender, for Lilith’s defiance and eventual submission seems part 
of the nineteenth century’s gender politics.
 Lilith’s apparent defeat as she collapses and eventually goes off 
to sleep can be viewed as MacDonald’s attempt to “tame” the passionate 
character into his religious mythology of redemption. Dijkstra argues that one 
significant image of woman in the later half of the nineteenth century was “the 
collapsing woman” (64), who must collapse or sleep as a consequence of 
her overabundant desire, which manifested “in the throes of overindulgence 
in autoerotic pleasures” (79). Paintings of the sleeping or collapsed woman 
depict her to be “at once the object of erotic desire and a creature of peculiar 
self-containment, not really interested in, and hence not making any demands 
upon, the viewers participation in her personal erotic gratification” (69-70). 
Since Lilith is a creature of pure Self and desire, she should continue to roam 
the narrative like Keat’s femme fatale in “La Belle Dame Sans Merci.” But 
MacDonald feels compelled to silence her and make her a passive, submissive 
object, a static being designed to be gazed at. Ironically, this turns Lilith into 
an object of desire. As Dijkstra suggests about the sleeping woman: this pose 
allows the male “once more to enter into a voyeuristic, passive erotic titillation 
within a soothing, undemanding context conducive to a state of restful 
detumescence” (78).
 Thus Lilith remains a dividual self: though controlled, she still reflects 
the tension between Adam’s desired angelic innocence and Lilith’s self-desire, 
remaining in a state of self-postponement, waiting to be born. The ambiguous 
ending of the fantasy supports this contention, for Lilith’s transformation from 
monster to angel is not complete at the end of the fantasy—she remains in 
transformative process. And there are hints at the end that MacDonald is torn 
over Lilith’s female power and her relinquishing of it to patriarchal control. A 
key symbol is her clenched hand that seems to represent all the evil of her Self. 
[34] Try as she might, Lilith cannot open that hand, and in a way remains 
symbolically defiant; she yields, but not completely. Lilith is brought to the 
House of Death where she meets Eve—the symbolic intersection of the great 
archetypes in the work: Angel (repentant Eve) and Monster (Lilith). In a final act 
of unmaking Lilith’s Self, Adam cuts off her defiant hand, and in its place begins 
growing a beautiful hand. All Lilith can say at the end seems mere defeatism: 
“Show me then to my grave; I am so weary I can live no longer” (225). Lilith’s  
Self is castrated by Adam, the great father, and as McGillis argues, “In Lilith 
little pleasure derives from the text: the imagination is castrated” (53). That 
castrated imaginative force is Lilith, who has provided the desire for Self and 
life that makes the work fascinating. This castration can also be seen as a form 
of “therapeutic rape,” to use Dijkstra’s term (83). Adam—a representative of 
patriarchal, religious power—must therapeutically rape Lilith—representative of 
monstrous female power—so that Lilith can transform into the passive, angelic, 
Eve figure. The castration scene, consequently, fuses the erotic and the religious, 
for Lilith’s powerful desire is attractive (remember Vane’s attempt to heal the 
naked Lilith earlier in the novel), yet repulsive, and the hand is chopped off 
finally in the name of religion. “MacDonald was of the Devil’s party without 
knowing it,” quips McGillis (53), for he recognises the attractive power Lilith 
holds over MacDonald’s imagination. Lilith’s hand, we may speculate, represents 
creative feminist power at odds with patriarchal power; thus the hand as power 
must be castrated, silencing the female creator. The monstrous hand can no 
longer hold the monstrous pen.
 After the symbolic castration, Lilith speaks no more, yet the fantasy 
continues for seven more chapters. Lilith dissolves in the work, her identity 
gone. But to MacDonald’s credit, he does not have Lilith rise immediately to a 
new life. At the end of the novel she is in process, so the haunting image we are 
left with is as follows: Lilith, asleep on the death-couch, awaits to be born. But 
since we do not have any image of a transformed Lilith, we are still left with her 
monstrous Self—with the Lilith myth in general—hovering over the fringes 
of the narrative. Her self is still postponed. And MacDonald balances this 
postponement with Vane’s postponement into Heaven, for he is returned back 
into his library, the fantasy-world narrative never closed, the final chapter 
entitled “The ‘Endless Ending.’”
 This endless ending seems entropic, as if the narrative about Lilith 
fizzles out, returning to Vane, who is pushed back into his library to wait for 
death. “I wait, asleep or awake, I wait” says Vane (264). For MacDonald death 
is life, or more life. MacDonald’s focus on death as redeeming life creates the 
impasse in Lilith and is in itself fascinating, for MacDonald as writer has death 
serve as a new beginning, but to Lilith death is an end to Self and enslavement 
to a self [35] created by others. Thus Lilith, to a degree, does not fit into the 
fantasy’s theme. Bersani argues that “only death can provide us with a myth 
of uninterrupted life” (213); death is “the most appropriate metaphor for that 
radical transference of the self to another” (211). But such an uninterrupted 
life to Lilith is perpetual enslavement as an angel figure, so she does not 
go gentle into that good night. For MacDonald, however, whose life is in its 
waning years, death as more life is an enticing prospect. George Bataille in 
Death and Sensuality contends that “discontinuous beings that we are, death 
means continuity of being” as we “yearn for our lost continuity” (16). Death 
as continuation of life—only better life—is what Bataille labels “religious 
eroticism” that is “concerned with the fusion of beings in a world beyond 
everyday reality” (16).
 Lilith’s seemingly inconsistent ending in the service of MacDonald’s 
religious eroticism cannot be ignored, but the ending’s failure may be part of 
the book’s success. Lilith, concludes McGillis,
          survives as a great book not because of its emasculating strictures 
          against changing sex roles, social dislocation and individual 
           identity, not because of its eschatological vision, but because of 
           the subversive power of its mysterious images. The book resists 
           systematisation; it delights in paradox, in synecdoche, in riddle, in 
           metaphor, in pleonasm, in oxymoron, in change. (53-54)
But Wolff states: “As we near the end, the imagery of Lilith breaks down 
completely. On the one hand MacDonald paints the picture of a triumphant 
resurrection. On the other, evil is all about, even on the ‘frontiers’ of heaven 
itself (369). Both McGillis and Wolff are accurate in their assessments. 
MacDonald’s religious eroticism may be at odds with Lilith, for MacDonald 
wants to want death to be a continuation of life; Lilith does not. And though the 
literary creator—MacDonald—tames Lilith and has her lie down in the House 
of Death so that she can live in eternity, the Lilith myth refuses to be so 
accommodating. Lilith is subdued but not silenced; she haunts the fringes of 
MacDonald’s fantasy. She continues to haunt Vane’s dreams: “Her words were 
terrible with temptation” (233).
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[Note: this article was submitted to the other contributors of this volume 
of North Wind. Their comments—and the writer’s response to these 
comments—immediately follow this article.]
Initial Responses to “Of ‘Frustrate Desire’”
Deirdre Hayward
 Taking a feminist approach to Lilith, given its title and focus, is 
obviously appropriate, and in many ways valuable. The author argues that 
Lilith is a divided self, torn between a life of feminine submission and angelic 
perfection (that desired for her by others), and a life of active rebellion, 
a “self-desire” which is subversive and inimical to “societal unity.” She is 
therefore condemned to “self-postponement,” sacrificing her own desires for 
a (female) self to a Christian notion of selflessness, unable to embrace either 
position. Understood thus, the piece is persuasive in that it explores the main 
issue of feminism—the relationship between the sexes in terms in inequality, 
oppression or submission, and self-affirmation. However, it also raises questions 
about definitions: how comprehensively, for example, can a feminist critique 
of Lilith identify the so-called feminist issues in the text? How well does a 
theory which presupposes patriarchal dominance deal with the possibility that 
concepts like love and salvation, although achieved through submission and 
self-loss, may not derive from the tyranny of the “patriarchal signified,” but 
rather from a genderless mystical necessity (as mystics would affirm)? And 
how well do theories of feminism correspond to the extraordinary complexity 
of MacDonald’s vision here, in a text which is famously resistant to any 
“rational” (including feminist) critique?
 My feeling is that, valuable as a feminist approach can be, its scope is 
limited, and an understanding of Lilith needs to be incorporated into the widest 
possible parameters, ones which themselves strain against any defined or 
systematic structure. The paper leads us to interpret the book in terms of binary 
oppositions: male/female, self/society, angel/monster, trapped/free, passive/ 
active. However, how secure are these expressions in terms of a fundamental 
stable meaning-structure? As Derrida argues, not at all. Derrida’s analysis 
of texts focuses on the conceptual oppositions they rely on: speech/writing, 
masculine/feminine, self/other. In examining these terms, Derrida destabilises 
them, concluding that there is no fixed meaning to the transcendental signifieds 
encapsulated in the “black and white” of oppositions and definitions. To 
interpret Lilith, therefore, in terms of masculine/feminine oppositions is to be 
trapped in parameters which are superficially “fixed” but fundamentally 
unstable. MacDonald’s own use of language, context, place, time and narrative 
are in the Derridan sense “playful” or slippery, and loosen fixed constructs so 
radically that there is often no relationship between his speaker’s meaning and 
the system of conceptual-linguistic signs within which he works—as, for 
example, Mr Raven so clearly demonstrates in chapters 2, 4 and 5, and Vane on 
[38] pages 9 and 46. From Saussure, Derrida argues that all signs, spoken or 
written, are arbitrary: system-relative and self-referential. Hence his insistence 
on the inherent instability of language, and his emphasis on ambiguity, pun, 
indeterminacy—all prominent features of Lilith. Given the instability of 
MacDonald’s text, it seems to me that a deconstructuralist approach would 
illuminate its openness more fruitfully than a feminist critique.
 I am therefore uneasy about statements such as “[Lilith] must sacrifice 
her feminine desire for self to the Christian myth of selflessness.” At one level, 
everyone (male and female) has a “desire for self,” and it is quite feasible 
to argue intellectually, without reference to gender, that the self should be 
sacrificed (German romantic philosophy was full of this, as are most religious 
mystical traditions). Is a “feminine desire for self’ different from a “male desire 
for self,” and in what way? Perhaps a clearer way of writing this would be “her 
desire for a feminine self,” but again, this begs the question as to what such a 
self may be. Against the author’s argument, a traditional view of feminine “self-
desire” (and is this what is meant here?) is more likely to put self last than first, 
and the question then arises whether this is “natural,” or learnt passivity. This in 
turn is of little value unless we know what is meant by “natural,” or from what 
sources such passivity is absorbed. Again, problems arise in referring to Eve 
(and females like her) as “passive angels” where “passive” clearly implies 
negativity: “[Lilith], refuses to lose Self and become the passive angel 
represented by Eve.” This is a disingenuous use of the adjective as it implies that 
“passivity” is somehow wrong in an angel, and that there must be the possibility 
of “non-passive” angels, who are more positive than “passive” angels. It is 
difficult to make sense of this. The omission of the word, however, would not 
suit the author’s argument, and would open the way for reader-sympathy with 
Lilith for not choosing the angelic option: she would maintain her own identity 
in defiance of women who were “willing to become angels.” Using qualifiers 
in this way to support a discussion can diminish the force of the underlying 
argument.
 Another issue arising from the feminist approach is whether there can 
be “self-postponement” without a sense of self which is being postponed. In 
MacDonald’s slippery text, Lilith can be any number of selves: a creation of 
Vane’s mind—clothed “in the likeness true / Of that idea where his soul did 
cleave!” (150); a self-made being, “my own thought of myself (209), and a 
child of God—”another has made you” (209)—; a mythical being (the original 
Semitic legend); a fictional character, both as MacDonald’s heroine and as the 
subject of a poem in Vane’s library; and there are clearly more options to be 
explored. If Lilith has not been given a wholly defined self, we cannot assert 
anything definite about that self, yet the feminist argument clearly assumes an 
[39] oppressed female self, defining Lilith exclusively as such a self. Rather, 
Lilith is a not-yet-self, chaotic and unformed, waiting for birth and, importantly, 
for definition.
 The perception that Lilith is forced to make an unenviable choice 
between the two options of “angel” and “monster” does little to bring the 
feminist argument forward, or allow Lilith to move onwards. The crux of the 
narrative problem is, as the author observes, what can be “done” with Lilith. 
MacDonald is accused of writing himself into an impasse on this view, but it 
is the feminist argument which has trapped itself in the closure of mutually 
exclusive possibilities and can offer no solution. Additionally, such polarities 
have, as Derrida has argued, no fixed reference points, and therefore it is 
meaningless to ask whether Lilith should “remain free,” “become fulfilled,” 
or “remain in a lack” so long as we have no criteria for knowing what it is 
that (female) freedom, fulfilment or lack signify. There are no answers, and 
MacDonald himself leaves the question open, attempting to give it a theological 
solution, to be sure, but not conclusively tying up the threads.
 Lilith is rightly described as having an “ontological slipperiness”: it is 
this which makes her frightening and powerful, needing to “be silenced,” not, 
I would argue, the notion that she is a monstrous female, forced into twisted 
femininity. The point is supported if we try viewing MacDonald’s “bad” male 
characters—for example, Count Funkelstein (David Elginbrod), Lord Morven 
(Donal Grant), or James Blatherwick (Salted With Fire) solely as “twisted 
masculinity.” Certainly, they may be “monsters,” but not because of their 
masculinity; for MacDonald it is their humanity, their being, that has become 
diminished. All evil for MacDonald is ultimately less specific to male/female 
behaviour than to humanity failing to reach its true potential. Lilith is “evil” 
because she is “evil,” not because she is female. And her evilness lies in her 
sense of self, not as a female, but as a human being who has committed hubris. 
This is the core of Lilith’s problem, and that of every individual, male and 
female, in MacDonald’s novels: living only in self and not in God cannot be 
endured and must be reversed. Feminist critics continually condemn MacDonald 
for oppressing, “castrating” Lilith by making her give up her self, yet no one has 
yet advanced the parallel accusation that Robert Falconer—for example—or 
Cosmo Warlock have become emasculated because they fought with self and 
gave it up to God. MacDonald has empowered Lilith by allowing her to 
transcend gender stereotype, setting her above all oppositions except self and 
God, the only binary oppositions which ultimately mattered. His theology 
demands the death of such a false self to allow birth of the “true” self, and this 
is always non-gender-specific in his texts. The feminist argument that in this 
opposition between self and deity, God is still a patriarchal tyrant, merely shifts 
[40] the argument to the ultimate “Transcendental Signified” (God), who, on 
a deconstructionist account, is an arbitrary sign, unstable and system-relative, 
wrongly understood by Lilith’s false self. MacDonald was at pains to deconstruct 
this tyrannical image in much of his writing, but Father or Mother God both 
would require the same self-renunciation as is required of Lilith.
 If we have an argument with MacDonald in Lilith, we must concern 
ourselves more with his philosophy of self-renunciation than with feminism if 
we are to attempt an understanding of such a complex text. The issues at stake 
are more theological and existential than gender-specific. The lack of “closure” 
in the book is yet another deconstructionist technique to make MacDonald’s 
wider point: if there is no reality except the self and God, then, he is saying, 
there can be no end to the on-going of that relationship. This applies as much to 
Vane, the man, as to Lilith, the female. For MacDonald, all individuals are self-
postponing—“waiting to be born”—until they find their selves in God. Like 
Vane, “asleep or awake,” they wait.
David Jasper
 Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar begin their study The Madwoman 
in the Attic with a question: “Is the pen a metaphorical penis?” If indeed the 
nineteenth century saw the fictional reversal of the Johannine image of the 
Word made Flesh in the body of the male saviour into its female opposite, the 
flesh made word, then the Victorian male writer not only condemns woman to 
a literary subjugation, he also portrays her in glorious opposition to incarnational 
theology. Unknowingly he releases her into a world which is the mirror image of 
the first chapter of the Fourth Gospel—a deathly fate, but a powerful one in the 
pages of his text.
 This is the world of MacDonald’s Lilith. According to apocryphal 
Jewish lore she was unlike Eve, not created subordinate to man but like Adam 
from the dust. Adam’s first wife, before Eve, she considered herself the equal of 
her husband, and refused to lie beneath him and submit to a patriarchal marriage. 
As punishment she was condemned to suffer the daily deaths of one hundred of 
her demon children.
 Lilith deconstructs the construction of women and the myth of 
Christian redemption inscribed by the pen of the patriarchal male writer. She is, 
indeed, more than MacDonald’s text can control—that has been Lilith’s nature 
from the very beginning. She remains murderously alive, refusing the aesthetic 
conclusion that has been made in the interstice between death and the dead 
feminine body (Elizabeth Bronwen, Over Her Dead Body, 1992). The Victorian 
heroine must either submit to the patriarch, and therefore become a second Eve, 
or else die. [41] Lilith does neither and effectively castrates the male pen(is) 
of MacDonald. In the twentieth century, the textual trap which MacDonald 
falls into has been explored in the erotic writings of Georges Bataille, whose 
Madame Edwarda (1956) is also Lilith in: 
          a book which leads God upon the stage. God in the plenitude of 
          his attributes; and this God, for all that, is what? A public 
          whore, in no way different from any other public whore. But 
          what mysticism could not say [because] at the moment it began 
          to pronounce its message, it entered it—entered its trance, 
          eroticism does say: God is nothing if He is not, in every sense, 
          the surpassing of God: in the sense of common everyday being, 
          in the sense of dread, horror and impurity, and, finally, in the 
          sense of nothing . . . .
             No use laying it all up to irony when I say of Madame Edwarda that 
            she is GOD. But God figured as a public whore and gone crazy.
 So is Lilith, then, this figure as she continues to haunt Vane’s dreams? 
She is the mirror image of John 1, the darkness which “shines” in the light, 
the mysterious heart of the postmodern, the rebellion of the text.
Adelheid Kegler
 MacDonald is mainly discussed as a Christian writer. Is it possible 
that the parameters of discourse concerning his oeuvre and his art have hitherto 
tended to overlook the very spiritual context and traditions which inspired it 
and to which it points? The interpreter’s critical look at the Christian message 
has neglected MacDonald as an excellent Symbolist. He belongs—along with 
Edgar Allan Poe, Le Fanu, Baudelaire; Brjussow, Solovyov, Ensor and other 
representatives—to this last great common European movement in the arts.
 A gender study may indeed throw some light on any work of art, as it 
might do on Lilith. Yet gender studies of works such as Le Farm’s Carmilla or 
Uncle Silas, Charles Dickens’ Edwin Drood, or Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du Mal 
would only hint at a minor aspect in these works and would miss the important 
topics and messages of late Realism and early and later Symbolism. If Lilith 
is critically approached as a gender-study in connection with the basic theory 
of MacDonald as a Christian writer, the issue of the analysis will be more or 
less predictable. The researcher, regarding a female character in the light of 
a patriarchal religion, will find what he looks for: the motifs of a religion the 
traditions of which are connected with ideologies originated in late antiquity; 
in some phases of mediaeval Aristotelianism; and, perhaps most of all, in 
the climate of fear of early Modernism. All these sources have amalgamated 
and produced a fateful disqualification of women, including the demonising 
of women and the theories about women’s physiological debility. In case of 
her rebellion, the Christian author has to put his female Prometheus-figure in 
chains (once again). [42] MacDonald abstains from such stereotypes. His 
works show a great variety of female characters with traits as complex as 
those of the male characters (an aspect in which he differs most agreeably 
from Dickens). The figure of Lilith should not be hastily paralleled with 
stereotypes like the languid, cold hearted temptress Lufa in Home Again. In 
many traits Lilith also resembles the mature, responsible heroines such as 
Hester Raymount in Weighed and Wanting. 
 It is rather tempting to read the figure of Lilith as a rebellious woman, 
who tries to define herself against a patriarchal God, or even without him. But 
approval or disapproval of MacDonald as a Christian writer is irrelevant here. 
When thought of as preaching a Christian message he tends to be seen as 
being overpowered by the mighty Lilith-myth which must be integrated into 
Christian thought-structures: which means that Lilith must be overthrown, 
castrated, depersonalised and, finally, killed. Her destiny must remain 
unsure, as she is not to be fitted totally into the writer’s world-view. On the 
whole, then, the Lilith myth is considered “too expansive for MacDonald’s 
fantastic imagination.” With this approach, the meaning of Lilith is reduced 
to one aspect, which, because it is isolated from the whole, misleads our 
understanding, producing a restricted crippled image of what the oeuvre is 
about.
 Would a gender-study’s access to Carmilla manage to analyse the 
stress of Le Fanu’s horror, the menace of the laws of an alien world, if 
Carmilla was seen as overpowered by victorious men at the end of the story? 
Or would such an approach to the figure of Maud, the female protagonist 
of Uncle Silas, make it clear that the story is a parable of Hell? Would it be 
possible to show Edwin Drood as a “Todesroman” as Stephen Prickett has 
suggested in comparing Edwin Drood with Lilith, if a gender study took the 
figure of Rosa Bud as a key to the novel? It would work the other way round, 
because if the structure and imagery of the Todesroman is understood, the 
figure of Rosa is easily inserted as a symbol of a last (female) flower in a 
decaying world.
 Of course it is most interesting to pursue the outlines of a figure like 
Lilith. There are fascinating traits to be found: her appearance, her manners 
of moving and speaking, of changing her shape; Lilith surrounded by the 
landscapes she has created, the architecture which underlines, symbolises and 
expresses her; Lilith as the author of the mysterious book in Vane’s library, 
“written in some universal language of the soul” (Prickett), which makes 
it clear she is a projection of Vane’s highest aspirations. It is strange that a 
paper which stresses Lilith’s being denied “creative feminist power” does not 
discuss these most important passages.
 All these aspects supply much information about female idols of 
MacDonald’s time and about haunting threatening femininity as MacDonald 
saw it. But in this paper the analyst is only at the beginning of a single 
approach to [43] the parable of Lilith. The polished formal structure, as well 
as the content, point to the work as a parable (just as Uncle Silas: A Tale 
of Bartram Haugh is a parable of Hell). The theme of Lilith is earthly life 
as the realm of death. With this conception, MacDonald’s work is rooted 
in the tradition of “Romantic Agony.” (Cf. for example, a title such as 
Chateaubriand’s: Mémoirs d’outre Tombe.)
 As Stephen Prickett has shown, MacDonald’s Lilith has an antecedent in 
the figure of Geraldine in Coleridge’s “Christabel,” which has been an antecedent 
for some of the most powerful myths of the nineteenth century, among them 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and Dr Polidori’s The Vampyre, and, of course, 
MacDonald’s Lilith.
 The context of negative imagination, leading from the Romantics to 
late Realism and Symbolism, to German expressionistic lyrics and expressionistic 
art in general, up to the “mental landscapes” of the films of David Lynch (Twin 
Peaks, Lost Highway, Mullholland Drive) and Jim Jarmusch (the landscapes of 
death in Dead Man and the apocalyptic urban landscape in Ghost Dog) is the 
context of Lilith as well.
 “Natural causes only seem,” “nobody is what he or she seems to be,” 
“there’s more to the picture than meets the eye”: these formulae contain the key 
to the view of reality which underlies the examples given above. Swedenborg’s 
“natural causes only seem” sums up one of the powerful sources of Romantic 
and symbolistic art. Identity and causality are ambiguous. A landscape, a 
churchyard, a piece of music, a manor house, a pious old gentleman and his self-
righteous brother; they are not what they seem to be. They are, as it were, tips 
of invisible icebergs. Uncanny dimensions are manifested above or beneath 
our known natural and supra-natural reality. Although Vane is a young heir in 
this world, he is the androgyne Vane/Lilith in the other natural and supranatural 
dimensions. The borderline between “the two worlds, so strangely . . . one” is 
symbolised by the mirror in the attic of Vane’s house.
 In the works of Le Fanu and MacDonald (both influenced by 
Swedenborg), there are still connections across the borderline between and 
supra-natural reality on the one hand, and correspondences to the natural 
appearances—even if only dim ones—on the other. But already in the 
paintings of James Ensor, also, perhaps, in some traits of Lilith, and some 
decades later in expressionist poetry and painting, the correspondences move 
more and more into the invisible realm.
 “Floating through the darkness / all alone / love is gone in darkness / 
cold as stone / Searching through the shadows / you have known/ love’s gone 
/bare as a bone.” Is David Lynch’s verse from the album Floating into the 
Night an intensification of the Lilith experience or is it already manifest in 
MacDonald’s parable? [44] 
 Some consequences: 
 1. As with every other modern or traditionalist approach, the gender-
study approach to literature does, of course, produces answers or results which 
may be verified within the frame of the respective model. Mythopoeic works 
are multi-layered and concern the whole scale of existence. They contain 
socio-cultural aspects which may be isolated and analysed separately. But 
at the very least it remains rather unsure whether such analysis does justice 
to the literary work, or whether only a cognition of some of its contents has 
taken place. With MacDonald’s Lilith (and some of his other works), there is, I 
think, no essential difference between a conventional, traditionalist (Christian) 
approach and what is called a modern one (i.e., gender-study). The world-views 
(paradigms) from which both these approaches originate are rather restricted.
 The episode of the cutting off of Lilith’s hand may be taken as an 
example. In the imagery used by the gender-study approach it signifies, as the 
paper in question shows, a form of castration, which is in part applicable to 
Lilith’s situation. But is that all? A more comprehensive view of mythopoeic 
tradition shows that the loss of a hand means much more: it is not only 
punishment and shame, but also an initiation by dismemberment (cf. the story 
from the Mabinogion of Culhwch and Olwen, where Gwalchmei, son of Gwyar, 
has lost one hand and is by this initiated as hero. The theme also appears in John 
Irving’s recent book The Fourth Hand.)
 2. Though some time has passed since the 1979 study by Sandra Gilbert 
and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic, the attic motif has not yet been 
considered as a symptom of the state of modern western consciousness in 
general as a consciousness of isolation, a consequence of the development of 
western thought-structures and ethnocentrism.
 The history of literature from the late eighteenth century up to now 
shows such an accumulation of this and kindred motifs that they cannot easily be 
overlooked. So, if one is not content with a system-immanent literary analysis, 
one should not renounce a comprehensive approach, based on an extensive 
knowledge of the history of ideas and the history of consciousness, and of the 
techniques of comparative literature: “Specialist” modern approaches may then 
throw some additional light on the phenomena of a work of literary art.
The quotations from Prickett’s paper “Death in Lilith” come from Inklings 
Jahrbuch 13 (1995).
Colin Manlove
 This is a useful, clear essay, if a bit overwritten, and it expresses a 
strand of truth about Lilith that cannot be gainsaid. (In fact, it’s odd that such an 
interpretation has not appeared before.) Few readers have ever been happy 
with that brutal [45] severance of Lilith’s refusing hand, and few have 
remained unmoved by her terrifying presence in the story. Without doubt, her 
history reflects unacknowledged repressions in Victorian society and mind.
 There are just one or two points I would make. First, MacDonald, as 
a habitué of the unconscious, and as an explorer of the night side of the nineteenth 
century mind, would have been quite aware of the magnetic power of a Lilith 
and all she represented. And what she represents is much more than crushed 
female sexuality. She need not represent anything MacDonald himself repressed, 
any more than he suppressed his awareness of the degradation of women and 
children he saw in the slums of Manchester or London. (As for MacDonald’s 
own personal repressions, we know little of these, if they existed. So far as we 
know, his marriage was a truly equal and loving one, and it is mistaken to 
assume that any Victorian marriage necessarily shut Lilith out.)
 However, there was that in MacDonald which had always been 
responsive to the flirtatious animality of women, for his books are full of them, 
and the embarrassments and shames they cause. So in Lilith he is confronting 
something he would recognise and had often struggled to deal with—and clearly 
here this involves lopping her nature so that she can fit heaven. He is in a sense 
on both sides—God’s and Lilith’s. It is possible that his solution was to hand 
over the work to God, whom he claimed as the author of Lilith: that way God 
could simplify MacDonald while the narrative simplifies Lilith.
 Then I’d point out that if Lilith is to be seen as a symbolic story of sexual 
and theological repression, that is not the whole truth about it—any more than 
that the truth about MacDonald’s beloved Blake is that he was simply of the 
devil’s party in writing The Marriage of Heaven and Hell. To say that in Lilith 
a side of MacDonald is drawn to Lilith does not remove from the strength with 
which the other side is drawn to God. The religious/mystical/Christian side both 
holds and is compromised.
 (Incidentally, the Blakean analogies the writer of the paper makes 
seem to undermine the case being made, for they point to a warring marriage of 
Heaven and Hell, a reconciliation of the Energy of a Lilith with the Reason of an 
Adam, whereas the writer sees Lilith as wholly divorced from God and man.)
Next, some points about the stories themselves. Lilith’s femininity is not 
final. MacDonald in Phantastes depicts Anodos as being as full of desire and as 
voracious as Lilith, if not so savage. The Ash and Alder trees turn up because 
part of him is them. Anodos’ whole journey involves the slaying of self, a 
journey he knows is never finished in this world (290). To this end he is cut out 
of Fairy Land by swords just as Lilith is cut out of the purgatorial world she 
inhabits by the severance of her grasping hand of self. There are other parallels. 
Anodos being protected by the Beech Tree at a cost to its vitality is partly like 
[46] Lilith being saved by Vane while the white leach is sucking his blood. 
On the other hand, Anodos’ wakening of the White Lady is also like Vane’s of 
Lilith. MacDonald uses similar narrative patterns and characters in his early and 
his late fantasy, which removes from the feminist specificity of what happens 
in Lilith. Indeed the two works are so interwoven by parallels and contrasts and 
by their overarching subject of First Things and Last, that Lilith’s nature is 
much more integrated in a web of religious meaning than appears by considering 
Lilith on its own. In this larger context, the Christianity, integrated as it is in the 
material, is much less of an imposition on the “free self.”
 Nor is Lilith inextinguishable desire, for on her own she is almost dead 
when Vane finds and revives her. Rather than treat her as a separate being, it 
is more appropriate, as in Phantastes, to see each meeting as reflective of the 
spiritual state of the protagonist—here called Vane. When Vane goes through the 
mirror in his attic, he goes into his own, and God’s, unconscious. In symbolic 
narrative we are always being pushed beyond merely surface reading and the 
notion that each character is an island. Lilith is in great part the old devil in 
Vane himself, and when he attends to it, he lets that devil go about roaring. 
Here again, the Christian meaning of the text is not an imposition, but is wholly 
integrated in the material. This is not the whole truth about Lilith, for it also deals 
with Christian realities and ultimates, but it is certainly a part of it, and makes 
Lilith no more a woman man she is part of the mind of a man. 
 Specific textual comments:
 There are misreadings on page 29 especially at line 5: the whole point 
about Vane is his vain insistence on himself, his continual refusals to lie down in 
the house of the dead.
 Page 30, line 19. The view continually put forward by the story is that 
the so-called personal self is actually a slave, and that one only finds one’s true 
self and perfect freedom in God. Doubtless this is only the religious view, but 
the same “only” can be applied to the view that makes Lilith a doomed rebel 
against the cosmic system.
 Page 30, last paragraph. Bersani’s view of Victorian fiction and life alike 
are certainly questionable in relation both to the recent socio-literary work 
of Michael Mason and others, and to the literary facts. The evidence suggests 
that the Victorians, from Victoria down, were far less repressed than the myth 
has supposed. The crowds of prostitutes emerged more out of poverty than out of 
the aridity of Victorian marriages. Bersani’s remarks about desire being a threat 
to the unity of the self, the state, or the novel seem at least open to challenge. 
Similarly with Bram Dijkstra’s views as summarised on pages 33-34.
 Page 32, line 1. Adam does not want to possess Lilith: he wants to free 
her from herself. The whole interpretation of Heaven as repressive rather misses 
the [47] facts. Arguably Lilith represses her self, by not allowing it to die. She is 
told that her deepest self’s desire is to be one with her creator, and that the self 
she so cherishes is actually the slave of the great Shadow of Hell. Is this simply 
to be ignored as a piece of Christian legalism?
 Somewhere around this point the paper has made its case, and the 
remaining material could usefully be abbreviated.
Rod McGillis
 It is well said that Lilith is a “divided self.” But perhaps more to the 
point she is a multiple self, a self that is not a self, or a self that comes into being 
only in and through desire. In other words she is all of us and none of us. As 
Adam’s first wife, Lilith is the first woman, and as a creation from red earth 
like Adam himself, she both is and is not Adam. She is eternally the Other 
and simultaneously she is eternally the self. She is, in short, the “Ideal I.” I take 
the term “Ideal I” from Jacques Lacan, of course. And I do so to initiate a reading 
of MacDonald’s Lilith that strikes close to the reading of MacDonald’s great 
book in the essay, “Of ‘Frustrate Desire’. . .”
 MacDonald is, I think, well served by readings that respect his sense of 
exploration and ongoing process and development; his sense that language, like 
all things human, is impossible to contain. Opposition is true friendship precisely 
because it keeps thoughts and feelings moving, perhaps even progressing. And 
so, if MacDonald himself has any connection with “feminism,” then this is the 
necessary connection any writer sincere about questions of liberation must have 
with the feminine enterprise.
 If Lilith is the Ideal-I, then she is the reflection of all of us, readers 
and characters. She is an unrealisable Imaginary, reflecting, as she says, “every 
woman” (150). To find this “bodiless thing,” this “nameless something,” after 
which he hungers, Vane travels through a mirror. He then brings Lilith to life 
“out of himself (151). I am quoting here the words Adam reads to Vane in 
chapter 29. Significantly, the words Adam reads appear to be Lilith’s. But 
we know that these words are just as much Adam’s as they are Lilith’s. In 
this mirror-land of Imaginary things, everything reflects everything else. That 
which appears to be other is, in reality, the self. To put this another way, all 
the characters are out-issues of Vane’s own imagination, the characters he 
encounters manifest aspects of his desire. They are symptoms of his desire. 
Lilith, the paramount symptom, is not so much “absence of desire,” as she is the 
impossibility of desire.
 MacDonald has constructed a deeply intricate and disturbing 
psychological field. Vane “births” Lilith as his Other in the mirror phase of his 
development, but Lilith is also the mother he has lost. His desire for her is a 
desire both to be [48] the person he imagines himself to be and to return to that 
time when the self was One. His desire for her is “frustrate” because he cannot 
have her from the outset. She is the alluring and illusive ideal-other that is the 
self always and ever just beyond completion and beyond containment Lilith’s 
appearance in Vane’s life precipitates him into a world of fragmentation, a 
world of symbolic meaning. She is dangerous because she represents both 
Vane’s libidinous desire and his shifting of desire onto the material world. 
Lilith is obviously the femme fatale, she who would be obeyed. But her very 
insistence on being obeyed signifies the law of the father. Lilith is overseer, 
tyrant, governor, master. She is the female who controls the phallus, and this is 
why she must suffer symbolic castration and silencing.
 Lilith may be domesticated “so she can be like the other women in 
the fantasy” but Vane does not cease desiring. The object of his desire becomes 
Lona, Lilith’s daughter. Lona appears safer, less narcissistic, less directly Vane’s 
“other self” than her mother. Lona is both child and mother, a virgin mother. 
She is non-threatening. But she too is beyond consummation. Vane cannot 
have Lona any more than he can have Lilith since to complete these loves would 
be to satisfy desire, and the satisfaction of desire can only come at time’s end, 
time no longer. Satisfaction entails both a forward movement and a regression, 
a return, a regaining of that which was lost at the moment of reflection, fall, 
consciousness, speech, initiation, loss.
 I mix discourses here, I hope purposefully. Of course, MacDonald 
speaks from a specifically Christian perspective. No one would dispute this. 
And of course, Lilith is about a return to values we understand as Christian. Lilith 
comes to remove herself from the influence of the Great Shadow, Samoil, Satan, 
and to accept the guidance of the New Adam. But MacDonald’s genius was to 
write more than he knew. That he understands the living nature of language and 
its products is clear from his well-known essay “The Fantastic Imagination.” 
That he was interested in the psychological as well as spiritual growth of the 
individual is clear from his essay “A Sketch of Individual Development.” And 
that he was well aware of the social and economic realities of his day (the 
“woman question,” socialist movements, and economic disparity between labour 
and management) is clear from many of his novels. He was also nimble enough 
to play intertextual and intellectual games of the kind identified in his work by 
John Docherty and Fernando Soto. In short, his work, and most especially his 
great and troubling book, Lilith, will sustain many approaches.
 Although I do not think that one must find proof that MacDonald 
shared an interest in a specific subject in order for a reader to locate such a 
subject in his work, the reader who sees “feminist” interests in Lilith, or who 
finds a Blakean source for the apparent structures of binaries in the book can 
find such proof. [49] MacDonald did move in “feminist” circles and he was 
an admirer of William Blake. Just as Blake saw the human psyche drawn in 
two directions, in one direction by a Spectre and in the other by an Emanation, 
MacDonald sees his characters, including Vane, drawn in two directions. The 
struggle between Spectre and Emanation or between the Symbolic and the 
Real (we can shift language depending on what spin we wish to bring to our 
reading) is ongoing, it moves us always to an endless ending. And so we can 
move to the language of trace, aporia, abyme and so on. 
 Thus I can only applaud a reading of Lilith that acknowledges the 
powerful attraction Lilith undoubtedly has for MacDonald and that attempts to 
understand the significance of this attraction. The book’s lapse into “entropy” 
seems unsatisfactory, it is suggested, because of MacDonald’s shift of erotic 
energy from Lilith to death itself. This may be true, but for me the apocalyptic 
journey of Vane and the Little Ones, with its evocations of Dante, Milton, 
Blake and Revelation, and Vane’s continuing yearning for Lona, underscore 
the erotic nature of that sehnsucht or longing that is always MacDonald’s 
theme. The desire for completion is a desire for physical as well as spiritual 
satisfaction. If Lilith represents the body’s desire and the desire for the body, 
as I think she does, then she cannot be absent Her absence in the final pages 
testifies to her continuing presence, even if in some less recognisable form than 
she had earlier.
Richard Reis
 In the following commentary, I shall not address the argument of this 
study, for I am not sure that I understand that argument. Instead I shall focus on 
the chief reason for my uncertainty, the language, both of the author and of the 
critics cited. Much of that language approaches the unintelligible: the jargon is 
arcane, the terminology undefined.
 Right at the outset we encounter such an obscurity: the author neglects 
to explain what W. M. Rossetti meant by “self-postponement,” nor in what sense 
it can be feminist as in the study’s sub-title. Without such initial clarification, the 
reader is sure to have difficulties in comprehending the argument. In the fourth 
paragraph, however, we find what appears to be an attempted explanation:
          Lilith is condemned, like Laura and Lizzie in [Christina 
          Rossetti’s] Goblin Market, to “self-postponement”—she must 
           sacrifice her feminine desire for self to the Christian myth of 
           selflessness, ultimately denying her power as woman to that 
          transcendental patriarchal signifier, God.
But again obscurity prevails over lucidity. What is meant by “signifier”? If 
Lilith’s Self is to be sacrificed, isn’t that a different thing from being postponed? 
The author tries to clear things up by citing Kathleen Blake’s definition of 
self- [50] postponement: “the evasion of one pattern of self limitation [which] 
involves the imposition of another,” but this makes the terminology even more 
impenetrable.
 Indeed, the critics cited in this study have a proclivity for the obscure 
which even surpasses the author’s. I am at a loss to comprehend what Nina 
Auerbach means by “that disruptive spiritual energy which engorges the 
divine.” Or consider the following citations. Roderick McGillis tells us that “in 
Lilith, little pleasure is derived from the text: the imagination is castrated.” What 
does Bram Dijkstra mean by “therapeutic rape”? George Bataille’s puzzling term 
“religious eroticism,” which shares with the McGillis and Dijkstra citations 
a sexual vocabulary of questionable applicability even as metaphor, is 
supposedly clarified by Bataille himself as “concerned with the fusion of beings 
within a world beyond everyday reality.” What is erotic about that? As for the 
author’s quotations from Rosemary Jackson and Leo Bersani, I find them so 
bewildering that I cannot even trace their obscurity to a word or phrase, as I can 
with the others.
 The author of this study then, shares with the critics whom he cites the 
idea that exotic metaphor is an appropriate tool of literary criticism. By contrast, 
I believe that plain English and prosaically lucid definition of terms is the better 
language when trying to analyse works of literature. And look at this study’s 
vocabulary: “dichotomous,” “oxymoronic,” “ontological,” “detumescence,” 
“entropic,” “eschatological,” “synecdoche,” “pleonasm.” I had to look up the last 
of these, and no doubt most readers of North Wind (and of George MacDonald!) 
would be similarly frustrated. Perhaps such ostentatious flaunting of polysyllabic 
terminology (see—I can do it too!) is at home in professional journals of literary 
criticism (although I myself would refuse to read them for that very reason), but I 
do not think of North Wind as such a medium.
Author’s Response to Above Comments
 When Alice meets Humpty Dumpty on her journey through Looking-
Glass Land she is impressed with the talking egg’s dexterity with language.
“You seem very clever at explaining words, Sir,” said Alice. “Would you 
kindly tell me the meaning of the poem called ‘Jabbberwocky?’”
“Let’s hear it,” said Humpty Dumpty. “I can explain all the poems that ever 
were invented—and a good many that haven’t been invented just yet.”
A literary critic is somewhat like Humpty Dumpty, for a critic has that Humpty-
Dumpty audacity to feign understanding about a work under examination—and 
to foist that understanding onto unsuspecting critics, who are also playing the 
nursery-rhyme hero. As we all know, however, a literary interpretation is merely 
one possible explanation for a work of art. Such interpretation is always open to 
[51] one possible explanation for a work of art. Such interpretation is always 
open to debate. In fact, literary interpretation is vital—and invigorating—
precisely because it leads to intellectual sparring among critical participants. 
The lion needs the unicorn. When John Docherry, the editor of North Wind, 
inquired about my willingness to subject my essay to a public forum of critical 
debate, I agreed immediately. The following two-part essay will chart my 
responses to the six MacDonald scholars who critique my essay on Lilith.
Twas brillig and the slithy toves.
 Though the audience for a critical essay is always to a degree a 
sceptical reader, the writer of an essay hopes that most readers will be 
convinced of the essay’s persuasiveness. I am grateful to Colin Manlove, David 
Jasper and Roderick McGillis for their general support of my argument. Each 
writer, in turn, challenges many of my claims and presents counter-arguments 
that push me to reconsider and tweak my argument.
 Colin Manlove writes that: “This is a useful, clear essay, if a bit 
overwritten, and it expresses a strand of truth about Lilith that cannot be 
gainsaid . . . Undoubtedly her history reflects unacknowledged repressions 
in Victorian society and mind.” Manlove, to quote him again, confirms my 
suspicion that MacDonald was aware, “of the magnetic power of a Lilith 
and all she represented.” Manlove focuses on MacDonald’s willingness to 
embrace Lilith and God, which creates a tenuous relationship: “So in Lilith 
he is confronting something he would recognise and had often struggled to 
deal with—and clearly here this involves lopping her nature so that she can fit 
heaven. He is in a sense on both sides—God’s and Lilith’s.” My allusion to 
Blake attempted to capture a similar sentiment, though I believe that Manlove 
states the concern more directly and eloquently. I also agree that Phantastes 
and Lilith, in effect framing texts in MacDonald’s canon, should be considered 
together as expressing his struggle with fleshly desire and love of God. In Lilith, 
Manlove finds that:
           the Christian meaning of the text is not an imposition, but is wholly 
           integrated in the material. This is not the whole truth about Lilith, 
          for it also deals with Christian realities and ultimates, but it is 
           certainly a part of it, and makes Lilith no more a woman than she 
          is part of the mind of a man.
Willing to make larger universal claims about Lilith than my essay does, 
Manlove supplements my argument. I also appreciate his “specific textual 
comments.” That he challenges Bersani’s and Dijkstra’s contentions by referring 
to Michael Mason’s work on Victorian fiction and desire further enhances my 
initial claim in this response: that criticism evolves. These debates are at the 
heart of the academic enterprise. [52]
 Rod McGillis’ response begins with a much stronger claim than I make 
in my essay: “It is well said that Lilith is a ‘divided self . . . . But perhaps more 
to the point she is a multiple self, a self that is not a self, or a self that comes into 
being only in and through desire. In other words she is all of us and none of 
us.” McGillis filters his argument through Lacan. As such, he demonstrates 
that Vane’s desire of Lilith:
           is an unrealisable Imaginary . . . . To put this another way, all the 
           characters are out-issues of Vane’s own imagination, the characters 
           he encounters manifest aspects of his desire. . . . Lilith, the paramount 
            symptom, is not so much “absence of desire” as she is the 
          impossibility of desire.
I agree wholeheartedly with McGillis—a Lacanian approach provides us with a 
vocabulary that allows us to express the inability to achieve desire: that “Objet 
A.” Vane’s first-person account reinforces this too, for language is incapable of 
articulating desire (which reflects the writer MacDonald’s struggle to write of 
this desire). If I would further pursue a Lacanian analysis, I would argue that 
God, as the patriarchal Phallus of desire, castrates the Lilithian desire but 
becomes only a temporary fulfilment, thus thrusting Vane, MacDonald and the 
reader further into the throes of the quest to satiate desire. Thus MacDonald’s 
Christianity provides temporary solace and additional frustration—Lilith and 
God achieve the same effect. McGillis’ final assessment of Lilith becomes a 
useful coda to my analysis:
           for me the apocalyptic journey of Vane and the Little Ones, with 
           its evocations of Dante, Milton, Blake and Revelation, and Vane’s 
           continuing yearning for Lona, underscore the erotic nature of 
           that Sehnsucht or longing which is always MacDonald’s theme. 
           The desire for completion is a desire for physical as well as spiritual 
           satisfaction. If Lilith represents the body’s desire and the desire for 
           the body, as I think she does, then she cannot be absent. Her 
           absence in the final pages testifies to her continuing presence, even 
           if in some less recognisable form than she had earlier.
 Another more postmodern articulation can be found in David 
Jasper’s review. He writes:
          Lilith deconstructs the construction of women and the myth of 
          Christian redemption inscribed by the pen of the patriarchal male 
           writer. She is, indeed, more than MacDonald’s text can control—
           that has been Lilith’s nature from the very beginning. She remains 
         murderously alive.
Jasper revisits Gilbert and Gubar’s The Madwoman in the Attic and provides 
a slight twist: he inverts gender roles,, arguing that Lilith—unwilling to “submit 
to the patriarch . . . or else die,”—does “neither and effectively castrates the 
male pen(is) of MacDonald.” In effect, Jasper reinforces my argument about 
the [53] paradoxical character of Lilith. He effectively grafts his version of 
the anxiety of influence onto the Christian myth, concluding that Lilith “is the 
mirror image of John I, the darkness which shines in the light, the mysterious 
heart of the postmodern, the rebellion of the text.” I have always found that 
MacDonald’s fantasies and fairy tales play with metafictional techniques, 
which make his writing simultaneously Victorian and quite contemporary. 
Jasper’s view that Lilith reflects the rebellion of the text further places 
MacDonald within the context of postmodernism. This should not be that 
surprising, for Lewis Carroll and MacDonald push the limits of narrative. 
Whereas Carroll’s “nonsense” elides larger theological concerns, MacDonald 
confronts them, which makes such works as Phantastes, Lilith, and, I would 
add, At the Back of the North Wind, quite exhilarating and troubling.
All mimsy were the borogoves
 If borogoves are critics who challenge my approach, then I have found 
them in Deirdre Hayward and Adelheid Kegler. Hayward does admit that: 
“Taking a feminist approach to Lilith . . . is obviously appropriate, and in many 
ways valuable,” but concludes that “valuable as a feminist approach can be, its 
scope is limited, and an understanding of Lilith needs to be incorporated into 
the widest possible parameters, ones which themselves strain against any defined 
or systematic structure.” She prefers a deconstructive approach that opens 
up the text without committing to interpretation. While I find a deconstructive 
approach intriguing, I am not convinced that it leads to any additional insight. 
What such an approach does, however, is ask a series of questions that are 
ripe for further speculation (dare I say additional analyses of Lilith?). I agree 
with her that the masculine/feminine dichotomy is problematic—as are all 
binary oppositions— but I would suggest that my argument is somewhat 
deconstructive: I attempt to show that Lilith resides in that “space larger than 
imagination” that is neither masculine nor feminine. At the same time, though, 
I do believe that MacDonald uses the gender dichotomy consciously and that 
his strain of Christianity is primarily patriarchal, ultimately at odds with Lilith. 
The fact remains that we are conditioned by binary thinking, and MacDonald is 
no exception—look at his structuring in “Little Daylight” and “The Day Boy and 
the Night Girl.” Hayward finally suggests that “Lilith is ‘evil’ because she is 
‘evil’ not because she is female. And her evilness lies in her sense of self, not as 
a female, but as a human being who has committed hubris.” It appears then, that 
Hayward rejects my feminist strain by deconstructing the feminine-masculine 
dichotomy, but I find that she commits a similar binary opposition—evil exists 
only in relationship to good. I would suggest that my feminist approach opens 
up Lilith as much as a deconstructive one could, and I would argue that my 
claim that Lilith haunts the fringes of the fantasy is to a degree deconstructive. 
[54]
 Another critic who challenges my approach is Adelheid Kegler, who 
writes, “If Lilith is critically approached by a point of view which connects the 
gender study aspect with the basic theory of MacDonald as a Christian writer, 
the issue of the analysis will be more or less predictable.” This is an insightful 
claim and supports Stanley Fish’s notion of interpretative communities: a 
discourse-community brings to a text a meaning that it finds according to its 
reading strategy. But Kegler’s complaint could be made about any theoretical 
approach to Lilith, particularly her own focus on MacDonald as a symbolist or 
mythopoeic writer. She contends that my reading of Lilith “as a whole oeuvre is 
reduced to one aspect, which, because it is isolated from the whole, misleads 
our understanding, producing a restricted crippled image of what the oeuvre 
is about.” By necessity, an interpretation is restricted as it evokes ideas that 
challenge—and often support—existing criticism, and I contend that finding 
a phenomenological truth about a writer is ultimately a confidence trick. J. 
Hillis Miller eventually became a deconstructionalist. There is not a whole 
George MacDonald. There are many George MacDonalds, father, husband, 
preacher, poet, critic, dramatist, novelist, fantasist. Kegler, on the other hand, 
is quite inclusive in her assessment of MacDonald, finding connections to Poe, 
Le Fanu and Baudelaire, to name only a few writers. Certainly these writers 
echo similar concerns to a degree. But to evoke the likes of David Lynch, 
Neil Young, and John Irvine and suggest that MacDonald’s Lilith is part of a 
larger mythopoeic movement that includes these men is suspect. I doubt that 
Lynch, Young and Irvine have even heard of MacDonald. In general I find 
the labelling of MacDonald as a mythopoeic writer as problematic as Kegler 
finds my feminist approach. C.S. Lewis, in fact, apologised for MacDonald by 
calling him a mythopoeic writer: “What he does best is fantasy—fantasy that 
hovers between the allegorical and the mythopoeic . . . . The critical problem 
with which we are confronted is whether this art—the art of myth making—is a 
species of literary art.” Lewis then suggests that MacDonald’s myth-making 
resides in his “particular pattern of events,” not in his actual writing: “Any 
means of communication whatever which succeeds in lodging these events 
in our imagination,” concludes Lewis, “has, as we say, ‘done the trick.’ After 
that you can throw the means of communication away.” Kegler’s approach 
to universalise MacDonald’s patterning of events—or his creation of women 
characters—ignores the social and aesthetic attributes of this myth-making, thus 
defining MacDonald as a passive conduit of archetypal themes. In my article I 
try on one level to explore the intricacy of MacDonald’s struggle with gender 
issues in a fantasy novel that thematically and aesthetically grapples with this 
concern. [55]
The vorpal blade went snicker snack!
 The one visceral response to my essay comes from a critic who 
is influential to MacDonald studies, particularly in the United States. I am 
referring to Richard Reis. His Twayne book George MacDonald, is now 
updated as George MacDonald’s Fiction: A Twentieth Century View by 
Sunrise. Reis objects to “the language, both of the author and of the critics 
cited” and suggests that “the author of this study, then, shares with the critics 
whom he cites the idea that exotic metaphor is an appropriate tool of literary 
criticism.” Thus Reis dismisses Nina Auerbach, Roderick McGillis, George 
Bataille, Rosemary Jackson, Leo Bersani and Bram Dijkstra, his complaint 
seeming more ad hominem attack. His desire for a lucidity of language begs the 
questions to a degree, for I suspect that he is reacting in general to theory that 
challenges more traditional thematic approaches. That Reis demands more 
clarity, while other critics urge me to embrace Derrida and Lacan (two writers 
not known for penetrability), reinforces the notion that literary criticism feeds 
on debate. Though I agree with Reis that criticism should be clear and concrete, 
I cannot agree that critical diction is necessarily jargon. What some dismiss as 
jargon is for others vital vocabulary. “Signifier,” for example, is so common in 
critical parlance that I was surprised that Reis challenges my use of the term. 
And for those terms that are a bit more obscure I can only paraphrase my friend 
Humpry Dumpty: “When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—
neither more nor less”!
And, as in uffish thought he stood
 My response to the above critics has been guided by the generosity of 
Lewis Carroll’s creations, so it seems fitting that I end where I began. I do indeed 
stand in uffish thought! If a critic is somewhat like Humpty Dumpty, then he 
or she is also like the White Knight, who can claim unabashedly, “It’s my own 
invention.” Literary interpretation is an invention. Some readers may find such 
inventions insightful, others may find them problematic, and some may feel 
they are downright preposterous, but the game of criticism is a useful activity 
because of that very debate. There is a method to literary debate. It is not a 
chaotic caucus-race. I do not for one moment suppose that my interpretation 
of Lilith is the quintessential reading of the great fantasy novel, Lilith. 
Having said that, however, I also believe that no critic has such a magical 
interpretation. Great works of literature continue to spur new inventions, and 
the conflicts in theoretical approaches are a catalyst for renewed debate: Any 
interpretation is just a momentary explanation that will immediately be in need 
of reinvention. In this way, a critic should remember the warning of the Red 
Queen: once you interpret, to use the words of Her Majesty, “It’s too late to 




 John Pennington finds a deconstructive approach “intriguing”; I find it 
much more than this, opening up texts, as it does, and changing conventional 
expectations and circumscribed interpretations. It seems clear to me that 
MacDonald himself adopts this approach: a close look at even his more 
conventional texts, such as Robert Falconer (Hayward, N. Wind 15, 19-25) 
or Donal Grant, shows how subversive they are, with normal expectations 
confounded. 
 With regard to binary thinking, Pennington is quite right to say that 
we are conditioned by it, and that MacDonald uses it; but MacDonald constantly 
strains against it. To deconstruct such thinking we are inevitably bound to 
employ those same categories of thought which we are trying to destroy—we 
have no other tools. Thus to say that MacDonald is so conditioned, is not to 
assume that he is unaware of it, nor that he cannot escape from it. After all, 
despite their life-long conditioning, the Day Boy and the Night Girl still manage 
to break their moulds. Pennington suggests that, having rejected his feminist 
account by deconstructing the feminine-masculine dichotomy, I “commit” a 
similar binary opposition by using the word “evil,” pointing out that “evil exists 
only in relation to the good.” I use inverted commas for “evil” as a deliberate 
disclaimer, which denies any conceptual solidity to the word, any defined 
ontological status. And I do this because MacDonald himself takes great pains 
not to set up “evil” and “good” as mere oppositions: indeed, for him they do 
exist in a relationship with each other, but on the same spectrum. Evil is “the 
only and best shape which, for the person and his condition at the time, could 
be assumed by the best good” (Phantastes, final para.) It is a false opposition, 
existing “only by the life of the good, and has no life of its own, being in 
itself death” (U.S. 512). Indeed, “all extremes” says MacDonald, “touch . . . 
they lean back to back” (Paul Faber 284). Further deconstructing the terms, 
MacDonald’s radical theology shifts conventional ideas of good and evil by 
arguing that evil is too much self, self- willed isolation from God, and good is 
abandoned self, renounced to God (see the sermon “Self Denial” and, of course, 
Lilith). Ultimately, good and evil are for MacDonald slippery, false oppositions, 
for “oneness” with the Divine is his goal, a state where all such oppositions 
are reconciled. The only one which matters is that of self (-will) or non-self 
(in God), and that is surely one which we can allow him. MacDonald must 
speak popularly of God as goodness and light as opposed to evil and darkness, 
otherwise the whole idea of a loving Deity becomes meaningless, as does the 
necessary “conditioning” tension within which he frames—and struggles to 
expand—his theological and metaphysical thought [57]
 Of course, Pennington is correct to say that no text can claim exclusive 
rights to one interpretative reading—and this naturally applies to mine. Yet I do 
value texts—and interpretations—which do not lead towards closure, as they 
remain alive and breathing, emergent, and continually challenging at new 
levels—a point also noted by Pennington. All interpretations can illuminate 
MacDonald’s text, and basically there is no “right” reading of Lilith—though 
there may be more restricted ones, which press limitations on MacDonald’s 
creative thinking.
Adelheid Kegler
 That a discussion concerning the interpretation of a work of literature 
is carried out controversially, goes without saying. But it should also go without 
saying, that that model of interpretation is preferable by which the interpreter 
is able to categorise the phenomena in question both in a more comprehensive 
way and with less contradictions than other models. That is the way the method 
functions which—drawing on the laws of thought—should be employed to 
verify conceptions.
 This position requires that cognition is possible. It is related to 
truth as a fundamental value, requiring an intelligent and responsible 
engagement to a reality beyond us. Great art deserves to be taken seriously, 
i.e., to be researched with the intention of true cognition. For it is itself under a 
commitment to truth: Truth is learnt, found, in specialised areas of art where the 
writer (for instance) struggles to make his deep intuitions of the world into artful, 
truthful judgement. This is the truth, terrible, delightful, funny, whose strong 
lively presence we recognise in great writers and whose absence we feel in the 
weak, empty, self-regarding fantasy of bad writers. (Murdoch 215)
 John Pennington understands himself as a representative of a school 
of thought which is engaged in the “game of criticism”—the worst sort of a 
game: a “useful activity”—by which meaning is severed from truth and language 
from world. Consequently, there is a complete lack in his exposition of the sense 
of obligation which should give every statement its philosophical basis. He sees 
himself in a position to dismiss any approach aiming at cognition as a mere 
“confidence trick.” He does not take note of my arguments which come from the 
context of the History of Consciousness. 
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Colin Manlove
 The original letter from John Docherty asking for reactions to John 
Pennington’s essay on Lilith, ventured that: “Nearly all our [North Wind’s] 
contributors have, it seems, either felt more comfortable with a more traditional 
critical approach or believed that modern techniques are inappropriate to 
MacDonald’s texts.” If that is so, several of them would seem to have changed 
stance, as four of the responses here emerge from positions developed in recent 
critical theory. The question of whether Pennington’s own “theoretic” approach 
was appropriate to an investigation of MacDonald’s work is not really addressed, 
perhaps because most agree with it, or else, as in my case, they tend to concern 
themselves not with the rightness of the approach so much as the yield of 
insight from it. Only Richard Reis raises objections to literary theory, but that is 
more in relation to its language than to the theory itself. The issue is however a 
real one here. How appropriate are the intellectual abstractions of literary theory 
to a writer who said his work was beyond such things? Or again, since most 
modern criticism would rather talk about different textual realities than admit 
the notion of a transcendent one, what has it to say of books that try to convey 
Christian or even mystical experience?
 Overall, both in the “fors” and the “againsts,” there is a sense of 
enclosed theoretic approaches rather than critical engagement. Pennington is 
being judged not so much on his merits, as by how far he fits in with the 
given critical position of his readers—good if he does, bad if he doesn’t. There 
is little notion that one might be learning something from him, and still less of 
a community engaged in the shared pursuit of exploring literature. It struck me 
that one of the reasons for this is that few address the specific text, wherein all 
debates gain clarity and can really interact. I’m not sure if the current view is 
not sometimes that “the text” is a conservative notion and that there are as many 
texts as readers (which in a sense has always been true), but surely these readers 
start from a common datum, or if they do not, we learn only about their views. 
Or perhaps there is a different datum now—not the text itself, but the text seem 
through the eyes of certain canonical theorists, who are often cited with a 
regularity previously bestowed on the author’s own words, and with a veneration 
not unlike that accorded by mediaeval writers to the auctores.
 So far as Pennington’s (generous) reply to the replies is concerned, I 
found it conducted on theoretic terms that made only one reference to the actual 
story and the text. It struck me more as a debate about the rightness of critical 
approach than about the rightness of conclusions, and as such it simply does not 
interest me. Pennington’s delight in “intellectual sparring” here is more one of 
well-conducted abstract discussion than of argued proof through evidence. This 
may [59] however be put down to the kinds of comments he received, which 
did not invite any other mode of reply.
 There seem to me however some specific points where a priori 
readings come near enough to the text to be questioned.
 i) In talking about Lilith as forced or repressed, the feminist argument 
seems not to consider how much she is a ravening oppressor to mothers and 
their babies in Bulika. Or is this to be seen as the consequence of her assumed 
rejection by Adam? If so, this in turn would raise the question of what she was 
like in the Zohar that this had to be done—and there one would find that it was 
Eve who supplanted her.
 ii) If Lilith is the “alluring and allusive ideal-other that is the self 
just beyond completion and beyond containment” (Rod McGillis), how is she 
different from the no more capturable ideal of the white lady in Phantastes?
 iii) Deirdre Hayward seems at pains to de-specify the text, so that Lilith 
has no fixed self, is not simply a woman, is not different from other evil or 
male characters in MacDonald’s work, and so on. But to say that, because her 
self is not “wholly defined” (whose is?) we cannot say anything valid about 
it at all, seems open to question. If that self is made of many selves, then those 
of them it attends to are real enough on their own terms, and to say feminist 
things about one of them is not to suppose that that one is all of them. Again, 
to say that “we have no criteria for knowing what it is that (female) freedom, 
fulfilment or lack signify” seems debatable since Lilith outlines them to Vane in 
chapter 25 (134-35) and Adam to Lilith in the poem fragments (150-153); and 
Lilith in a stunted way tries to live them as leopardess and in Bulika.
 iv) How is Lilith, the rebellious text against patriarchal Victorians 
(David Jasper), any different from, say, Paradise Lost? Isn’t there much 
sympathy for her here in just the vein of Satan versus God in Paradise Lost 
because she has such energy, and is the under-bitch? But in turn, isn’t the 
mystical drive of the book as strongly felt as she is? Surely the point is not the 
general one of the “patriarchal” nature of MacDonald’s faith (if it is that, since 
he always describes the Father as love), but whether fascination with Lilith has 
greater textual force than the drive towards God.
 v) I can find nowhere in the book which says that the volume from 
which Adam reads to Lilith was written by her (as Kegler and—apparently—
McGillis assume). It seems more like a dramatised monologue that damns her 
as she would not herself—her line is rather pages 134-35. It infuriates her, 
and its words when it is thrown before her have the consequence of fixing 
her, preventing her escape. [60]
Rod McGillis
 The various reactions to John Pennington’s reading of Lilith confirm 
the book’s power to provoke. I like this. I am also surprised to see that a so-
called “feminist’’ approach to the book raises such resistance. I gather that 
such an approach does not meet full favour because it reduces MacDonald’s 
complex book to a familiar tale of patriarchal authority and the diminishment of 
woman. As we know, feminism as both a method of textual interpretation and 
as social practice has changed considerably over the past thirty and more years. 
It has evolved through “second wave” feminism, through post-feminism, and 
into theories of gender, transgender, and gay and lesbian sexuality and being. In 
other words, feminism does not (and never did) offer a single way of reading a 
text. Feminism has always had connections with non-feminist ways of thinking: 
we have had Marxist feminist readings, mythopoeic feminist readings, psycho-
analytic feminist readings, and so on. None of these ways of reading necessarily 
delivers a one-dimensional text.
 On the other hand, we have yet to find a way of reading that does 
not reduce texts. Reduction is the inevitable result of any reading of a text. 
Clifford Geertz’s notion of “thick” reading is perhaps the closest we come 
to the possibility of non-reductive reading, but “thickness” may be well-
nigh impossible for each of us to achieve in our readings, and even if it were 
possible, I am not entirely convinced that even with a thick reading we would 
avoid reduction of any text we wished to explicate. A text should not mean, but 
be. Or the only complete reading of any text is the text itself. Borges’ “Pierre 
Menard, the Author of Don Quixote” makes the point, I think. The meaning of 
MacDonald’s Lilith is Lilith. Doesn’t MacDonald make this point in his essay 
“The Fantastic Imagination”?
 In this same essay, MacDonald also allows that each reader will make 
of a book what she will. And this is as it should be. Once each reader articulates 
his or her reaction, the conversation is on the way. And as the conversation goes, 
I suspect we can see that each of us that converses will, in the words of Adelheid 
Kegler, “find what he looks for.”
 If we locate Lilith in its historical context, then discussions of 
androgyny or of women’s concerns, or of the cult of the dead woman and so on, 
do not seem to me to be out of place. If we take just the question of women’s 
concerns and ask, as Deirdre Hayward does: “Is ‘a feminine desire for self’ 
different from a ‘male desire for self,’ and in what way?”—then we must 
answer, must we not?, yes. If the male desire is for the mother, then the female 
desire is from the mother. We may, of course, not accept the Freudian narrative. 
If we do, then the question of desire is distinctly gendered. Females must desire 
differently from males because of their different relationships within the family 
romance and their different anatomical and biological make-up. The interesting 
thing about Lilith is that her [61] desire is to be both the mother and the father. 
She wishes to contain both the fluid and the firmness. Such containment is 
impossible and she can only experience lack, even in the fullness of her power 
over Bulika. Lilith is confused in her sexuality, her desire is to be male as well 
as female. But of course, she remains subservient to the Shadow male; her 
desire finds its source in male desire. What MacDonald cannot do is imagine a 
truly female desire, as much as he may desire to do so. And so desire is the clue. 
Desire, however we define it, is that which eludes our grasp. It is that which 
males and females both experience as elusive.
 Perhaps what compels readers of Lilith, at least in terms of its title 
character, is that female desire looks forward to release, to change, to 
challenge of convention and authority. Male desire, on the other hand, looks 
behind, back to the mother who so comfortingly protected the young man. Vane 
finds Eve attractive, and Mara and Lona, females who represent nurturing and 
self-sacrifice and succour and beauty combined. They are images of the mother. 
To turn away from such a comforting image and contemplate a woman who 
challenges the law of the father (while accepting the law of the dark father) 
inevitably unsettles. That this book challenges our sense of comfort seems to me 
unquestionable, and such a challenge ensures that we cannot rest complacent 
with a one-dimensional reading. Desire is mystery, and mystery is the condition 
of Lilith.
Richard Reis
 John Pennington evidently misses my point, which is that the great 
majority of North Wind readers will find much of his article unintelligible. 
This is not a journal for literary critics only; it is equally for lay admirers of 
George MacDonald’s works and ideas.
 I did not, for example, mean to “challenge” Pennington’s use of 
the word “signifier,” but his failure to explain this technical term for most 
readers of North Wind. As for the critics cited in Pennington’s study, I did not 
“dismiss” their work nor engage in “ad hominem attack” upon them, but (again) 
deplored Pennington’s failure to elucidate the unclarified phrases of which I 
complain. For example, I am told that Bram Dijkstra’s study (which I have not 
seen) does explain his phrase “therapeutic rape.” Pennington could easily have 
provided the lay reader with the gist of that explanation, but neglected to do so.
 No, Dr Pennington, my commentary’s focus on your article’s language 
rather than its ideas is not “begging the question,” motivated, as you imply, 
by timid and compulsive conventional unwillingness to confront non-
traditional theory. For an argument to be considered by its reader, it must first 
be intelligible to its [62] reader. Neglect of this requirement may be merely 
negligence, but can give the impression of obscurantism.
Editorial Contribution to the Above Comments
 Contributors’ comments have ranged widely over the issues raised by 
John Pennington, but I feel that one or two important issues have not received 
attention.
 One perplexing aspect of modern literary criticism grounded in 
psychological theory is the way the existence of “natural laws” is usually 
ignored. All aspects of western culture have been subsumed by the consumerist 
ethos, with its assumption of an individual’s right to the (unpostponed) 
satisfaction of every desire. Yet, as Kegler implies, for thousands of years it has 
been known that if people have deserts within their souls (especially those in 
positions of power like MacDonald’s Lilith as ruler of Bulika and its hinterland), 
then their greed and folly soon creates external deserts (Inge, William Ralph, The 
Philosophy of Plotinus, London: Longmans 2nd ed. 1923, 28-31).
 In the case of MacDonald’s Lilith, the modern assumption is as absurd 
as it is irresponsible, because hers is not an autonomous identity. The internal 
nature of the adventures of MacDonald’s protagonist Vane is now generally 
accepted. Yet many critics nevertheless treat the figure of Lilith as an autonomous 
female, not as an aspect of (the outlook of) Vane and of every adult male. 
Certainly, she can think of herself as autonomous, but all her different selves are 
related to the adult male. MacDonald was an out-and-out subversive in every 
literary genre he took up—as Hayward stresses in the present discussion. To 
imply that, because he took up the Lilith myth he was obsessed with Lilith in 
the same way that Bram Dyjkstra shows so many men to have been in the late 
nineteenth century, is to ignore all his powerful subversive irony in Lilith.
 MacDonald concentrates particularly upon showing how the Lilith 
side of man can work towards disintegration of the personality. Where Mara 
(primarily acting as a personification of beneficial suffering) finally brings 
this home to Lilith in chapter 39, MacDonald largely confines himself to a 
straightforward, unbiased dramatisation of parts of Mark 9 and 10. He makes 
clear that what Lilith is being asked to give up is not-giving, nothing else; 
exactly as Christ-Jesus summarises in the passages of Mark which use the same 
imagery. To suggest that Jesus’ discourses here imply a “patriarchal” God, or that 
their moral content is “mythical,” would be absurd. Yet because MacDonald’s 
Adam-figure is depicted (at this stage of the story) as a patriarchal religious 
figure, he is identified with MacDonald, and the whole episode is assumed to 
display MacDonald’s patriarchal view of God. This view is held regardless of 
[63] MacDonald’s extensive irony throughout the story, not least the way the 
character who becomes Adam first appears as a Mephistophelian figure.
 Most of the themes which “feminist’’ readings recognise in Lilith are 
undoubtedly present, as is lucidly demonstrated by McGillis. MacDonald’s aim is 
not the approval or rejection of fin de siècle (or twenty-first century) fantasies 
about these matters. He seeks the roots of their manifestations. The fantasies 
themselves are as insubstantial as is Lilith herself when disintegrating into 
obscene fragments in the Bad Burrow (50), and MacDonald may well intend 
readers to recognise this initial glimpse of Lilith as a summation of her nature.
 A few days ago I noticed for the first time the relevance to Lilith 
chapters 38-40 of verses 33-50 of Mark 9 and 6-31 of Mark 10. (That 
MacDonald’s Unspoken Sermons begin at the same point may not be mere 
coincidence). Although much of Lilith is “biblical” in tone and in its central 
allegories, it seems to contain less actual biblical allusions than might 
be expected. When striking words or phrases are checked against a good 
concordance, however, allusions are found to be numerous. A first attempt 
at this, by Tim Martin, (North Wind 14 (1995), 75-78) suggests—as might 
be expected—that biblical allusions are most abundant in three chapters: 29, 
where Lilith as a bedraggled cat is confronted by Adam, 39 where Mara gains 
Lilith’s repentance, and 43 where Vane in his “death-sleep” talks with Adam. 
Martin’s check-list does not, however, bring out the crucial importance of the 
Mark passages.
 Mark 9.33-50, which is paralleled and supplemented by Matthew 
18.1-10, describes Jesus’ strong response to the disciples after they have been 
disputing as to who is greatest amongst them. The admonition is given “in the 
house” in Capernaum (verse 33). The definite article is unexpected here when 
there is no previous mention of a house. MacDonald takes up this symbolic 
emphasis upon “the house” by using it in the titles for chapters 38 and 40: 
“To the House of Bitterness “ and “The House of Death.” Jesus, siting down 
to indicate mat he is giving formal teaching to his disciples, first points out to 
them that if anyone wishes to be first they will be last of all (35). The principal 
stress in the Lilith legend is upon Lilith’s wish to be first amongst mankind. 
Adam tells her she will be “the last to wake in the morning of the universe” 
(228).
 Jesus then takes a small boy and sets him in the midst of the disciples, 
explaining that whoever takes a specific example of the truly childlike into their 
soul in a Christian spirit is taking Him (36-7). In Lilith, chapter 38, the Little 
Ones question the goodness of Mara. In response, she picks up Odo (the Little 
One who is closest to understanding and trusting her), permits him a clear 
glimpse of her normally veiled face, then sets him down among them (205). 
The Little Ones remaining with Vane at this stage of the story are a group of 
twelve [64] whom he has chosen as his disciples. And he has just previously 
been attempting pedantically to teach them moral-spiritual discernment—
fully living up to his homophone Vain. It should be added that after Lilith’s 
repentance, she gives her first sign (ever) of any concern for others when 
she hears the Devil (Great Shadow) outside Eve’s cottage and asks ‘”Are the 
children in the house?’” (226).
 Jesus’ words cause his disciple John to realise that he and the other 
disciples had exhibited spiritual arrogance on another recent occasion when 
they rebuked someone unknown to them who was casting out devils in Christ’s 
name. Jesus again responds strongly: “Whosoever is not against us is for us” 
(40). Many people pray to be delivered from Mara/suffering, but she is able to 
drive out devils. Her all-night vigil with Lilith, which is the subject of chapter 
39, is a casting-out of the Devil. MacDonald combines the Prince of the Air 
and the Prince of Darkness of his “A” draft into a conventional bat-winged 
image of “the” Devil, referring to this hybrid as the Great (i.e., everyone’s) 
Shadow and describing him as overshadowing Lilith. “Overshadowing” is here 
used as a neat alternative way of expressing “possession.”
 Jesus illustrates his meaning here by teaching the disciples that even 
small gestures of friendship, such as giving a drink of water, have their 
spiritual reward if the gesture arises from the giver’s recognition of Christ in 
a person (41). Mara gives the Little Ones their first-ever drink (of water) when 
they come to her house (205). Previously in the story, only skeletons and part-
skeletons, slowly re-growing their humanity, have shown any recognition of 
the Christ-nature of the Little Ones (199-200). Nothing Vane has ever done, 
ostensibly for their good, has shown genuine recognition.
 Jesus’ next comment refers specifically to “little ones” (42). This is 
often misunderstood because of a failure adequately to distinguish the Greek 
paedion (used for the small child in verse 36) from micron. “Little ones” are 
what start to grow in people’s souls when they begin to become again little 
children.
 Matthew 18 interpolates here Jesus’s emphasis that “it is a necessity 
that offences come” (7). This concept is absolutely central to MacDonald’s 
theology. From his own experience he had found that most if not all spiritual 
growth is through suffering and oppression.
 Many people, in rejecting Jesus’ next words: “And if ever your hand 
make you stumble, cut it off’ (43) have created a stumbling block to their 
own happiness. MacDonald’s depiction of Lilith’s ultimate desire to do exactly 
this has caused many people wilfully to reject Lilith. Because the whole of Lilith 
is spiritual metaphor, MacDonald has no need to stress that, the amputation of 
Lilith’s hand happens at the spiritual level. But it should be noted that me instant 
it is done Lilith falls “asleep”—which is the essential preliminary to entering into 
life in the sense this concept is used by Jesus and by MacDonald’s Adam-figure. 
[65] Raven/Adam (as perceived by Vane) is constantly changing, and not in 
all ways for the better. He rejoices in his patriarchal act of castration, but 
the Mark allusions show that he is here the unwitting tool of a higher power, 
which is Love—not patriarchal authoritarianism. Mara assures Vane that a 
“true, lovely hand” promptly begins to grow (229). Readers’ distrust might have 
been reduced had she stressed that this new hand is no different from the old 
before that had begun to be clenched.
 Jesus makes it clear that such cutting-out, if it is necessary, is to enable 
people “to enter into life.” He stresses its crucial importance by applying it, not 
only to the hands which should implement the love streaming from the heart, but 
also to the eye (47), which should look up for inspiration, and to the foot (45), 
which should tread rightly on the Earth. And, after each of these three, He 
alludes to the closing verse of Isaiah, warning that if people do not cut out an 
offending member their spirits must exist—before as well as after death— 
“where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched” (44; 46; 48). This 
fiery worm burrows into Lilith and is crucial in enabling her ultimately to 
recognise herself as she is (207; 210). It then presumably dies, its task achieved.
 Jesus’ final words in this discourse stress the core of his teaching 
here: that his disciples must learn to “have peace with one another.” He also 
emphasises that “everyone must be salted with fire” (49). This metaphor seems 
appropriate to Lilith’s ordeal, although it does not appear in any of the versions of 
Lilith. It is, however, used by MacDonald as the title for his next novel.
 The same teaching is taken up again with different emphasis in Jesus’ 
next discourse (Mark 10.6-31 paralleled by Matt. 19.4-26). It is first applied 
to marriage (6-12). Adam’s union with Lilith and subsequent marriage with Eve 
is essential to the plot of Lilith. Jesus quotes from Genesis: “male and female 
created he them” (6). MacDonald, like Blake, seems to read the Hebrew as 
indicating that humans were first created in heaven as male-female. The 
subsequent split involved loss of love. MacDonald’s Adam rectified this—as far 
as is possible for man on Earth—by union with Eve: “so then they [we]re no 
more twain, but one flesh” (8). But he has been unable to live satisfactorily with 
Lilith—a portion of his femininity which could not split off because essential to 
enable him to be attracted to Eve. This portion is not simply “the body’s desire 
and the desire for the body” as McGillis expresses it, although that is, of course, 
its most obvious element.
 Jesus repeats and extends with many children (13-16) his teaching with 
a young child in 9.36-37. Then a rich young man too attached to his possessions 
comes to seek help from him (17-27). MacDonald quotes Jesus’ response from 
verse 27 “’with God all things, are possible’” and then accurately summarises 
the earlier part of this response (23-26) as “He can save even the rich!” (216). 
[66] Jesus’s words are wholly appropriate to MacDonald’s context: love 
of possessions—including friends, relatives and aspects of oneself if these are 
regarded as possessions—does distract from deeper, selfless love (agape).
 Jesus summarises and closes this discourse almost as he began his 
previous one: by pointing out that “many that are first shall be last; and the last 
first’’ (31).
Second Part of Author’s Response Essay  
(Responding to Second Round of Critical Comments)
O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!
 I guess it can be considered a frabjous day when you can finally 
bring some closure to a critical project. I will be able to callooh! and callay! 
once I respond to the final round of comments the readers supplied. First 
and foremost I want to thank all the readers who read with utmost care my 
article. If I were asked to revise the article, I would revise according to all the 
comments presented, for gaps and lapses in an argument can only be found 
when a work is subjected to such critical scrutiny.
And the mome raths outgrabe: A Coda
 “Two objects . . . cannot exist in the same place at the same time!” So 
exclaims Vane to Mr Raven in Lilith. “Can they not?” asks Raven, “I did not 
know!—I remember now they do teach that with you. It is a great mistake—one 
of the greatest ever wiseacre made!” (20). Vane’s difficulty in understanding the 
seven dimensions in Lilith provides an apt coda to this critical discussion about 
MacDonald’s fantasy novel: when we interpret Lilith we should understand that 
there are simultaneous interpretations that often compete with—even negate 
—other interpretations. But taken together, they provide us with a holistic critical 
picture that becomes a kind of looking-glass into Lilith. In the paragraphs that 
follow I will briefly respond to the final comments of the critics who have 
sensitively read and subsequently critiqued my essay.
 My initial response to Richard Reis was based upon the assumption 
that he did not endorse literary criticism he deemed obscure, that is, criticism 
focused on more contemporary critical theory like feminism and post-
structuralism. But Reis’ primary concern is with audience: “John Pennington 
evidently misses my point, which is that the great majority of North Wind 
readers will find much of his article unintelligible. This is not a journal for 
literary critics only, it is equally for lay admirers of George MacDonald’s work 
and ideas.” Reis’ major complaint is that I need to define my critical terms more 
for the lay audience. On the one hand I agree with Reis completely, for the 
audience of North Wind is a hybrid one, ranging from MacDonald scholars (and 
Victorianists) to those lay admirers [67] that Reis identifies. I admit that for 
the latter audience my article (and this project in general) may confuse. On 
the other hand, a critical essay is designed for a specific audience, and I would 
argue that what a specialist audience expects is something quite different 
than a general overview of Lilith. I must further admit that my intended 
audience is the literary critics. Having said this, however, I hope that the 
critical conversation that has taken place in this volume of North Wind will be 
interesting to all readers of MacDonald, for this critical enterprise was designed 
to reflect an often-neglected fact: that MacDonald is a nineteenth century writer 
who remains vital today.
 Colin Manlove’s final comments compliment those by Reis. He 
suggests mat the critical debate focuses too heavily on the theoretical approach 
taken. “There is little notion that one might be learning something from him 
[Pennington] and still less of a community engaged in the shared pursuit of 
exploring literature.” Manlove is correct to a large degree. After reading my 
initial responses to the critics, I realised that my “defence” centred more on my 
approach than on how Lilith may be better understood. Central to Manlove’s 
overarching critique are two concerns: 1) “How appropriate are the intellectual 
abstractions of literary theory to a writer who said his work was beyond such 
things?” and 2) “Or again, since most modem criticism would rattier talk of 
different textual realities than admit the notion of a transcendent one, what has 
it to say of books that try to convey Christian or even mystical experience?” 
These are central questions that this project does not adequately address. I think 
an answer to the first question could be framed as follows: no writer has the 
authority to claim that his or her work is beyond critical approach, especially 
when literary criticism necessarily must reflect the mindset(s) of a particular 
time and place. Literary theory is the parasite that feeds off MacDonald, but it 
is the host that Lilith itself feeds off. In other words, theory injects new life into 
a literary work, further demonstrating the work’s enduring value. An answer 
to the second question is more difficult, and I would argue that there is not a 
satisfactory answer, especially for those defining MacDonald as a Christian 
writer. I might venture to say that in MacDonald’s case the claim that he is only 
trying to promote a form of Christian mysticism is doing an injustice to him: he 
is a much more complex man than that. I would evoke C. S. Lewis again, who 
shows that an apologist for MacDonald can simultaneously relegate him into 
the second- or third-tier of canonical writers.
 Rod McGillis contends that this critical experiment “confirm[s] the 
book’s power to provoke,” while suggesting that “we have yet to find a way of 
reading that does not reduce texts.” Evoking Clifford Geertz’ notion of thick 
reading, McGillis argues for a criticism that approaches such thick description. 
What you are reading in this volume of North Wind is an attempt at that thick 
description [68] of Lilith. McGillis adds a new idea to the discussion by 
suggesting that female desire is at odds with male desire: “What MacDonald 
cannot do is imagine a truly female desire, as much as he may desire to do so.” 
Thus Lilith “challenges our sense of comfort.” This is true too, to paraphrase 
King Lear.
 Of course, Deirdre Hayward would challenge McGillis’ binary 
oppositions of male versus female, desire, as she does with my essay’s focus 
on feminist self-postponement. She defends her “erased” terms of evil and good 
and suggests that MacDonald’s ultimate goal in Lilith is to find a “oneness 
with the Divine . . . , a state where all oppositions are reconciled.” I agree that 
MacDonald attempts to do this, but I contend that the Lilith legend is too great 
for him to silence into a oneness with God. Hayward’s view is that Lilith’s 
severed hand suggests that she is in the process of transforming into good—
”What’ we call evil, is the only and best shape which . . . could be assumed by 
the best good” (Phantastes 324)—demonstrating that MacDonald must speak 
popularly of God as goodness and light as opposed to evil and darkness, 
otherwise the whole idea of a loving Deity becomes meaningless, as does 
the necessary “conditioning tension” with which he frames, and struggle to 
expand, his theological and metaphysical thought.
 I once again agree with Hayward: MacDonald may desire to speak of 
God as goodness and light, but Lilith makes it impossible for him completely 
to do so, as she haunts the fringes, of the novel at the end, in process of becoming 
good, it seems; but this is a process that probably will never be complete—Lilith 
cannot be tamed. It is interesting that in the Curdie books MacDonald does 
not strive for such complete unity. The Princess and Curdie finds characters 
spiritually evolving or devolving, and the ending admits to Gwentystorm’s 
continual devolution to destruction. While MacDonald may intend Lilith to 
be a Lina figure, I do not sense that Lilith can reform like Lina, for she is made 
of material that defies. Hayward concludes that she embraces conclusions 
“which do not lead to closure, as they remain alive and breathing, emergent, and 
continually challenging at new levels.” I intended my essay to be that brand of 
interpretation. I can only hope that readers take it that way.
 Final we come full circle to Adelheid Kegler’s response and John 
Docherty’s editorial contribution. What do I mean by “full circle”? Kegler 
and Docherty represent a more traditional approach to MacDonald studies 
(and that is not a “bad” thing, it is just a “different” approach). Kegler, quite 
frankly, rejects my argument because she believes a critical approach should 
“categorise the phenomena in question both in a more comprehensive way 
and with less contradictions than other models.” To Kegler, great art has “true 
cognition,” a fundamental value and truth: Any criticism where “meaning is 
severed from truth and language from word” is suspect to her. She challenges 
my notion of (he [69] “game of criticism” as a “useful activity,” because 
it diminishes the value and importance of literature. I never meant any 
disrespect to the importance of critical debate by calling it a game that has some 
utilitarian outcome, but I do not believe, as Kegler does, that there is a definitive 
interpretation which comes from the context of the History of Thought Lilith 
creates such critical debate because the novel is slippery, is contradictory, “it 
challenges our sense of comfort,” to quote McGillis once again.
 John Docherty’s fine end-comment resides in the critical realm that 
Kegler supports. His Jungian approach finds fault with any interpretation that 
“treats the figure of Lilith as an autonomous female, and not as an aspect of 
Vane and of every adult male.” He suggests that the novel is partly about “how 
the Lilith side of man can work towards the disintegration of the personality.” 
In effect he embraces the concepts of anima and animus of the collective 
unconscious that is ever present and unchanging: he embraces Eric Neumann’s 
Great Mother. Furthermore, Docherty meticulously traces the biblical echoes 
from the New Testament (primarily Mark) which allows him to conclude that 
“the whole of Lilith is a spiritual metaphor.” Docherty’s interpretation certainly 
adds to our understanding generally and of Lilith specifically; however, 
his interpretation would certainly be challenged by most feminist readings 
(and deconstructive ones too). If Lilith is seen as the anima of Vane, then her 
cosmogony is reduced, for she is made from the same materials as Adam—she 
is equal, and she must flee when she rejects the notion of subservience to 
Adam the male. Thus Lilith becomes the femme fatale, the tempting whore of 
Jungian analysis, not an independent self. It follows then, that Lilith is seen only 
in relation to Adam the masculine, and only as a destroying figure. Docherty, 
of course, argues for the balance of the masculine-feminine in Vane, but the 
privileged signifier remains the masculine. Gilbert and Gubar in The Mad 
Woman in the Attic are persuasive when they argue for the independence of 
Lilith.
 I hope the readers of North Wind find this volume enlightening. I 
certainly found the project to be so. And I want to thank once again John 
Docherty, Deirdre Hayward, David Jasper, Adelheid Kegler, Colin Manlove, Rod 
McGillis and Richard Reis for their thoughtful and challenging comments. I 
could envision another go-around as we dig deeper and deeper into that complex 
work called Lilith. Maybe this critical enterprise should best be summed up not 
by MacDonald’s friend Lewis Carroll but by Lilith itself—we are finally faced 
with “The Endless Ending” of literary analysis. [70]
